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Abstract 
 
 
             The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley 
Act (“Act”), repealed a regulatory proscription in the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 that prohibited 
commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) from underwriting most bonds, equities, and insurance 
policies. After the passage of the Act in November 1999, BHCs that converted to financial holding 
companies (FHCs) were allowed to engage in securities underwriting without restrictions. The first 
paper examines whether the removal of barriers to securities underwriting had an adverse impact on 
the overall stability of the financial sector, and thereby, contributed indirectly to the financial crisis of 
2008. The DCC-GARCH time series model is applied to simulate bank returns for estimating several 
systemic risk measures. Comparing FHCs with various matched samples of banking organizations, we 
find an economically small increase in systemic risk at FHCs that resulted from the bank’s shift into 
previously ineligible activities. However, we find an economically large increase in systemic risk at 
FHCs that results indirectly from their rapid growth in assets. 
             In the second paper, bootstrap simulations based on U.S. open-end actively-managed 
domestic bond mutual funds between 1999 and 2016 show benchmark-adjusted returns that more 
than cover costs. The top 10% of all bond mutual funds generate significant precision-adjusted alpha 
𝑡(𝛼) from timing and selection. Results hold for government and corporate bond funds as well as 
across bond mutual funds stratified by assets under management (AUM). Timing is more important 
than selection, particularly in short 3-year horizons. Selection matters most for the largest bond mutual 
funds with AUM>$750M. The economic value (EV) from active management by the top 10% of 
bond mutual funds is 20 bps and 6.5 bps on AUM from timing and selection respectively. EV from 
timing of 37 bps is highest for the top 10% of corporate bond mutual funds, and from selection of 25 
bps, is highest for the top 10% of bond mutual funds with AUM>$750M. 
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Introduction 
             Passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act, also known as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley 
Act (GLBA), allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to become financial holding companies 
(FHCs). The deregulation allowed newly formed FHCs to engage in high-risk investment banking 
activities, such as securitization of risky bonds, trading of risky bonds and equity and underwriting of 
debt and equity issues; it also allowed FHCs to merge with investment banks, increasing the asset size 
of the FHCs. Moreover, the increased competition post-GLBA might erode charter value for 
investment banks (Keeley, 1990, AER), leading to greater risk-taking incentives. It has been a long 
debate on whether the GLBA should be repealed, and there is argument that the deregulation is a key 
factor caused the 2008 financial crisis. What was the impact of the Act on systemic risk in Financial 
Institutions?  Did it contribute to the instability of the financial system leading up to the Financial 
Crisis? Applying DCC-GARCH model to construct systemic risk measure (SRISK), the first study 
examines the possible impact of the passage of the GLBA on systemic risk in banking sector.  
             Whether mutual fund managers have economic contributions to the investors has been 
studied for decades, most of the researches focused on equity mutual funds, and the findings are 
mixed. Bond mutual funds on the other hand, attract less attention. The second study examines 
whether U.S. actively managed domestic bond mutual funds generate benchmark adjusted returns that 
exceed or at least cover their costs – i.e., do bond mutual fund managers exhibit skill, not just luck. 
Suppose fund managers exhibit skill, what kind of skill is more prominent? Security selection, market 
timing, or both? What is the economic value of their skill, if any? Are these patterns chiefly due to 
government, corporate, or both types of bond funds? Do government bond mutual funds with 
different average effective duration have different performance? Do corporate bond mutual funds 
with different average credit rating have different performance? 
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Paper 1:  
The Impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act 
on the Systemic Risk of Financial Institutions 
Lifa Huang, Wayne Y. Lee, Timothy J. Yeager 
University of Arkansas 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley 
Act (“Act”), repealed a regulatory proscription in the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 that prohibited 
commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) without Section 20 exemptions from underwriting most 
bonds, equities, and insurance policies.  After the passage of the Act at the end of 1999, commercial 
bank holding companies which converted to financial holding companies (FHCs) were allowed to 
engage in securities underwriting without restrictions. Deregulation allowed FHCs to diversify their 
activities and potentially improve profitability through economics of scope and scale. But the shift to 
debt funded securities underwriting away from long-established deposit based lending eroded charter 
value which encouraged greater risk taking by FHCs. This study examines whether the removal of 
barriers to securities underwriting had an adverse impact on the overall stability of the financial sector, 
and thereby, contributed indirectly to the financial crisis of 2008.  
 Our study focuses on changes in the systemic risk of commercial and investment banks 
subsequent to the passage of the Act. In particular, did the entry of FHCs heighten competition in 
securities underwriting, and as a result, the riskiness of investment banks? Compared to investment 
banks, were risk changes less significant for commercial banks that maintained their status as BHCs 
either with or without Section 20 exemptions, and more significant, for commercial banks that 
converted to FHCs? To answer the questions, we apply two versions of SRISK (based on SRISK from 
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Engle and Brownlees (2015)) as systemic risk measures: RISKMES and SRISKCoMES (both are defined in 
equation 11). We compute the measure in several ways: a) baseline SRISK using original total returns 
and original assets; b) Simulated SRISK using DCC-GARCH model simulated total returns (the 
simulated returns are based on original total returns, trading assets adjusted returns, or non-interest 
income adjusted returns, for different analysis) and original assets; and c) Simulated SRISK using 
DCC-GARCH model simulated total returns and hypothesized assets, the simulated returns again are 
based on original total returns, trading assets adjusted returns, or non-interest income adjusted returns, 
for different analysis.  As robustness check we also used other proposed risk measures; ΔCoVaR 
(Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2014) as well as MES and CoMES (Acharya et al. 2010). 
 Specifically, we test the following three hypotheses. H1: After passage of the Act, FHCs 
expand their business into investment banking activities, leading to greater risk taking; H2: FHCs 
engaged in activities with greater systemic risk post-GLBA because regulatory restrictions were 
removed; and H3: Investment banks’ charter values decreased because of the increased competition. 
We use above mentioned different versions of SRISK as the main measure to test the first hypothesis. 
As robustness check, we compute risk measures such as VaR, CoVaR, CoVaR_mean, delta_CoVaR, 
ES, CoES, MES and CoMES (each risk measurement will be discussed with details in the following 
methodology section). We also compute several other measures such as TobinQ, Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), and rolling window market beta and adjusted R-squared from Carhart- 4 
factor model. The period we exam is from 1993 to 2014. 
 Before the passage of the 1999 Act, there are three types of banks: 1) bank holding companies 
(BHCs), 2) bank holding companies with section-20 subsidiaries (S20s), and 3) investment banks (IBs). 
After the passage of the 1999 Act, there are five types of banks: 1) bank holding companies which do 
not expand their business into investment banking activities (BHC_BHC), 2) bank holding companies 
which expand their business into investment banking activities (BHC_FHC), 3) bank holding 
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companies with section-20 subsidiaries before 1999 and do not transfer into FHC after 1999 
(S20_S20), 4) bank holding companies with section-20 subsidiaries before 1999 and transfer into FHC 
after 1999 (S20_FHC), and 5) investment banks (IB_IB). 
 For analysis reported in this paper we separate all banks into five groups: BHC_BHC, 
BHC_FHC, S20_S20, S20_FHC, and IB_IB. We also construct two-group and three-group samples 
to exam the hypotheses from different aspects (results are not reported in the paper). In the two two-
group sample we separate all banks into the following two groups: commercial banks (CBs, include 
all banks except investment banks) and investment banks (IBs). The three-group sample includes: 
BHC_BHC (banks that do not expand business into investment banking actives before and after the 
Act), BHC_FHC and S20_FHC (this group is denoted as S20&FHC, it includes banks that expand 
business into investment banking actives after the Act, and before the Act they are either BHCs or 
S20s), and IBs.  
 Our study provides evidence that after the passage of the Act, commercial banks that engage 
in investment bank activities become risker in terms of the systemic risk we measured (especially, 
baseline SRISK, SRISK with DCC-GARCH simulation on stock return, and SRISK with DCC-
GARCH simulation on stock return and hypothesized FHCs’ book and market value which grew at 
the value-weighted growth rate of top 19 BHC_BHCs in each year), and the increasing risk taking is 
concurrence with the increasing investment activities among those banks, especially S20_FHC banks. 
Profitability (measured as Tobin’s Q) on average does not decrease among investment banks due to 
the competition from commercial banks. 
 2.0  Literature 
 Prior research on the impact of the Act focused on profitability and risk changes of banks 
surrounding the passage of the Act. Yeager, Yeager and Harshman (2005) find no strong evidence 
that FHCs attained significant benefits immediately following the passage of the Act. Stiroh and 
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Rumble (2006) conclude that diversification benefits among FHCs were more than offset by increased 
exposure to risky non-interest activities. Estimating equity return variance (total risk) and beta 
(systematic risk) in the 300 trading days around the passage of the Act, Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) 
showed that total and unsystematic risks of banks and insurance companies increased, but decreased 
for investment banks, following passage of the Act.  
 Using SRISK measures proposed by Brownlees and Engle (2015) to capture capital shortfalls, 
as well as equity tail risks proposed by Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) to capture systemic risk 
in the financial sector, but not changes in systemic risks prior and subsequent to the passage of the 
Act. 
 Our study in this paper apply several systemic risk measurements, or tail risk of the stock 
returns and capital shortfall for different groups of banks; more important, we focus on the systemic 
risk measure of SRISK (with baseline approach and DCC-GARCH simulation approach). The passage 
of the Act has short-term impact; meanwhile it might take longer time to exhibit its full impact on the 
financial sector, since not all banks expand their business at the same time and the effect of changing 
business activities takes time to observe. We use a longer time horizon with the hope to capture long-
term impact of the passage of the Act.  
 3.0  Data and Summary Statistics 
 Commercial and investment bank samples span the period January 1993 to December 2014. 
A CRSP-FRB link file from the New York Fed is used to construct a complete sample of commercial 
banks that are publicly traded over the sample period. Daily stock returns are obtained from CRSP 
using PERMCO numbers, and quarterly financial data from FR-Y9C using RSSD numbers. Sample 
of investment banks is constructed using SIC code 6211 eliminating any overlaps with the commercial 
bank sample. Daily stock returns are obtained from CRSP and quarterly financial data from 
COMPUSTAT using CUSIP numbers. For about 20 BHCs, missing quarterly data on total liability 
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and book equity are manually collected from SEC filings. Data on subprime mortgage backed security 
holdings of BHCs are compiled from SDA database. 
 Monthly percentage changes in the KBW NASDAQ Bank Index obtained from Yahoo Finance 
are used to proxy for a common market factor in bank equity returns.1 Monthly Moody's Seasoned Aaa 
and Baa corporate bond yields are obtained from the St. Louis Fed database.  
 We manually adjusted our samples for notable mergers and acquisitions by commercial banks 
and conversions of investment banks to FHCs. For example, Citigroup merged with Traveler 
Insurance in December 31, 1998. Prior to the merger, Traveler Insurance is classified as an S20 
exempted BHC with RSSD 1042351. Subsequent to the merger, Traveler Insurance is classified as an 
FHC with RSSD 1951350. Similarly, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are classified as investment 
banks prior to 2008, but as FHCs subsequently.  
 Samples of commercial and investment banks are classified into one of five groups depending 
on whether or their status remained the same or changed subsequent to the passage of the Act. 
BHC_BHC are commercial banks that never engaged in securities underwriting. BHC_FHC are 
commercial banks that did not have an S20 exemption prior to but converted to an FHC after the 
passage of the Act. S20_S20 and S20_FHC are commercial banks that had S20 exemptions prior to 
and either did or did not convert into FHCs after the passage of the Act. Average quarterly count and 
number of bank-quarter observations as well annual average of quarter counts in each group are 
reported in Table 1. 
< Insert Table 1 here.> 
 3.1 Distributions of Bank Size 
 The passage of the Act had no significant impact on the activities of the preponderance of 
                                                 
 1Missing January 1993 observation.  
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commercial banks which remained as BHCs. The majority of the conversions to FHCs were BHCs. 
Only a few commercial banks with S20 exemptions converted to FHCs. Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, a small number of investment banks converted to FHCs. 
 To evaluate the impact of the passage of the Act on the size distribution of commercial and 
investment banks in each of the five groups, we use market values of equity (𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖) to calculate a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) each quarter.   
 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 𝑁 ∙ ∑ (
𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖
 ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 )
2
𝑁
𝑖=1     (1) 
HHI has a minimum value of 1 when the distribution of bank size within the group is uniform and 
rises in value as the disparity in sizes within the group increases. Figures 1 graphs quarterly HHIs 
averaged each year.  
< Insert Figure 1 here.> 
 Although small in number, concentration is consistently high in the IB_IB group which are 
dominated by a few large bulge bracket investment banks. As shown in Table 2, the average equity 
market values of investment banks declined in the years immediately following the passage of the Act 
presumably from increased competition by FHCs. The contemporaneous fall in concentration 
suggests, however, that the adverse impact of competition did not fall equally among investment 
banks. Heighted competition was more acute for investment banks with higher growth opportunities.  
< Insert Table 2 here.> 
 Not surprisingly, disparities in the size are also high in the BHC_BHC group with the largest 
number of commercial banks. Although there was no notable change in average equity market values 
following the passage of the Act, there was a significant rise in concentration concomitant with an 
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increase in the number of BHCs. It appears the Act spurred the entry of smaller commercial banks.    
 Commercial banks with S20 exemptions are the least concentrated group. The members of 
this group tend to be large BHCs that are similar in asset size. Although there were no important 
changes in average equity market values for BHCs that converted into FHCs following the passage of 
the Act, the large changes in concentration particularly for the BHC_FHC group suggests there were 
winners and losers. Not all of the banks benefitted equally from the removal of barriers to securities 
underwriting.   
 3.2  Risks of Bank Equity Returns 
 Each year, daily equity returns over three-month rolling windows with one-month overlaps 
are used to estimate an excess returns model using the three Fama-French (1993) plus Carhart (1995) 
momentum factors. Estimated total risks, excess market return betas, idiosyncratic residual risks, as 
well as excess return model R2s are averaged across all three-month rolling windows each year. The 
annual averages for each group of banks are graphed in Figures 2 through 5.  
< Insert Figures 2 and 3 here.> 
 Total and idiosyncratic residual risks of investment banks rose and are highest with increased 
competition in securities underwriting from FHCs following the passage of the Act. Compared to 
commercial banks that remained as BHCs, commercial banks that converted to FHCs following the 
passage of the Act have lower the total and idiosyncratic residual risks. The reduction in equity risks 
from diversification is similar across the two groups, S20_FHC and BHC_FHC. Commercial banks 
that maintained their S20 exemptions also exhibit comparable reductions in equity risk, but equity 
risks remain elevated three years after the 2008 financial crisis. Interestingly, the reduction in equity 
risk is highest for FHCs following the 2008 financial crisis. Perhaps because FHCs benefitted most 
from TARP capital infusion and Fed QE liquidity programs in the crisis period as well as increased 
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capital requirements and constraints on proprietary trading post crisis.  
< Insert Figure 4 here.> 
 Reductions in risk from diversification come at a price. Securities underwriting activities are 
sensitive to changes in market conditions. As expected, commercial banks that remained BHCs have 
the lowest market return betas. Relative to investment banks, market return betas for commercial 
banks with S20 exemptions, S20_S20 and S20_FHC, are notably higher prior to the passage of the 
Act, but converged following the passage of the Act. The increase in market return betas is most 
dramatic for commercial banks that converted into FHCs following the passage of the Act.  
< Insert Figure 5 here.> 
 The correlation in equity returns is lowest for commercial banks that remained BHCs. 
Commercial banks in this group are smaller and more similar in size. Correlations for commercial 
banks with S20 exemptions that converted to FHCs following the passage of the Act are highest. The 
sharp rise following the passage of the Act presaged the 2008 financial crisis and remains elevated.  
 4.0  Systemic Risk Measures 
 For completeness, we considered all of the alternative measures of systemic risks proposed in 
the literature. But for brevity, we focus our reported results on capital shortfall risk measures. 
 a. 𝑽𝒂𝑹∝
𝒊  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑖 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖 ) = 𝛼% (1) 
is a value-at-risk measure. 𝑅𝑖~𝑁(𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑖
2)  denotes the equity return of bank i, and 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖  , a (non-
negative) critical value of equity return that defines a threshold probability of  𝛼%  that  𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖  
.  
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 b.  𝑪𝒐𝑽𝒂𝑹∝
𝒊  and ∆𝑪𝒐𝑽𝒂𝑹∝
𝒊  
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝐶(𝑅𝑚)
|𝐶(𝑅𝑚) = 𝛼% (2) 
is a relative value-at-risk proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014). 𝑅𝑚~𝑁(𝜇𝑚, 𝜎𝑚
2 ) denotes the 
returns on a reference benchmark. 𝐶(𝑅𝑚) = −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑚 is a (negative) lower bound on a reference 
benchmark and 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝐶(𝑅𝑚)
 is a critical value conditional on 𝐶(𝑅𝑚)  that defines a threshold 
probability of  𝛼%  that  𝑅𝑖 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝐶(𝑅𝑚)
.  Bank and reference benchmark returns are assumed 
to be collinear. 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑖|𝑅𝑚) + 𝜀𝑖   and  𝜎𝜀
2 = (1 − 𝜌𝑖𝑚
2 )𝜎𝑖
2  where 𝜌𝑖𝑗  denotes the correlation 
between bank and reference benchmark returns. The measure, which reflects the idiosyncratic and 
systematic risks of the bank’s equity return and the likelihood that the bank’s return will fall below a 
lower bound on the reference benchmark, captures a bank’s exposure to system wide distress.  
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅∝
𝑖  is used to evaluate the difference in value-at-risks when conditions are normal and 
when conditions are either good or bad. Following Ergun and Girardi (2013), we define 𝑅𝑚 as a 
market return and 𝐶(𝑅𝑚) =  −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚  as the lower bound market return under normal conditions. 
From Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014)  
 ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝑚
 =  𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝐶(𝑅𝑚)=−𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚
− 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖|𝐶(𝑅𝑚)∈[𝜇𝑚±𝜎𝑚]         (3) 
In (3), 𝐶(𝑅𝑚) ∈ [𝜇𝑚 ± 𝜎𝑚] denote the lower bound market returns corresponding to good and bad 
market conditions; i.e. values of −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚  when 𝜇𝑚 + 𝜎𝑚 and 𝜇𝑚 − 𝜎𝑚  .   
 c.  𝑬𝑺 and 𝑴𝑬𝑺 
 Expected shortfall is the conditional mean equity return when equity returns fall below a lower 
bound. 
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 𝐸𝑆𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑖|𝑅𝑖 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖 ) (4) 
and when bank and reference benchmark returns are assumed to be collinear. 𝑅𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑖|𝑅𝑚) + 𝜀𝑖, 
 𝐶𝑜𝐸𝑆𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑖|𝑅𝑚 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚) (5) 
These measures capture downside loss when bank returns fall below a lower bound.  
  d.  𝑴𝑬𝑺 and 𝑪𝒐𝑴𝑬𝑺 
 At the aggregate level, 𝑀𝐸𝑆 defines the marginal contribution of a bank to the expected 
shortfall on a portfolio that consists of a group of banks.  
Define 𝑅𝑝 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑅
𝑖
𝑖 ~𝑁(Σ𝑖𝑤𝑖𝜇𝑖, Σ𝑖Σ𝑗𝑤𝑖𝑤𝑗𝜎𝑖𝑗) as the portfolio return. 
 𝐸𝑆𝑝 =  𝐸(𝑅𝑝|𝑅𝑝 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑝) (6) 
and from Scaillet (2004), 
 𝜕𝐸𝑆𝑝/𝜕𝑤𝑖 = 𝜕𝐸(𝑅
𝑝|𝑅𝑝 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑝)/𝜕𝑤𝑖 (7) 
Similarly, when bank and reference benchmark returns are assumed to be collinear. 𝑅𝑖 =
𝐸(𝑅𝑖|𝑅𝑚) + 𝜀𝑖, 
 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑝 =  𝐸(𝑅𝑝|𝑅𝑝 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑗 ) (8) 
and 
 


   

  
 
/ ( | )/
( | )
p p p m
i i
p mi
MES w E R R VaR w
E R R VaR
 (9) 
  
e. 𝑺𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑲  
 This measure extends the 𝑀𝐸𝑆 approach by taking into account a bank’s liabilities as well 
equity market value in determining equity shortfalls. Conditional on a shock to the financial system, 
Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) define 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 as:   
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 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 = max  [0; 𝑘 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ)𝐸𝑖,𝑡)⏞                    
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
− (1 + 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ)𝐸𝑖,𝑡)⏞              
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
⏟                                   
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 (𝐶𝑆)
]  (10) 
where 𝑘 is the minimum fraction of capital each firm needs to hold; 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 are the book value 
of total liability and market value of equity, respectively. From (9), 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ  is the long-run 
marginal expected shortfall over a horizon of period length ℎ. Banks with the largest capital shortfall 
will contribute the most to financial instability, and are banks that will be considered systemically risky.  
 We define 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆 as 
 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡+ℎ = − 𝐸𝑡(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+ℎ|𝑡 |𝑅𝑖,𝑡 <  𝐶) (11) 
where 𝐶  denotes a lower bound value which is defined in two ways.  In 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆  , 𝐶 =
[𝑘𝐷𝑡 + (1 + 𝑘)𝐸𝑡] 𝐸𝑡⁄   is the lower bound on a bank’s equity return that will result in a zero-capital 
shortfall. In 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 , 𝐶 = −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚  and −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚 is defined by 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑅𝑡+ℎ
𝑚 ≤ −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑚) = 𝛼% (12) 
The derivation of 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 is presented in Appendix A.  
 As in Brownlees and Engle (2015) and Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012), we use the 
book value of total liability on the assumption that during the financial crisis, liability is not negotiable. 
Banks with insufficient capital will not be able to provide liquidity to troubled firms under unstable 
market conditions. Further, note that 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 increases with the leverage.  
 Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012) compute 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆 as the loss a bank experiences when 
the market falls by more than 40% over a six-month horizon. Daily 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 with 𝐶 set equal to 2% 
and approximate 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 ≈ 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝(18 ∙ 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡) . Brownlees and Engle (2015) apply three 
different approaches to estimate 𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆  but main results rely on a GARCH-DCC model with 
simulation. 
 Using 3-month rolling windows from 1993 through 2014, we compute quarterly 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 in 
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three different ways. The first or baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 uses historical data without simulation; the second 
uses a DCC-GARCH simulation described in Engle (2015); and the third, a DCC-GARCH simulation 
described in Engle (2015) with the added assumption that a bank’s book and market equity value 
grows at the value-weighted growth rate of the top 19 BHC_BHCs each year. Quarterly values are 
averaged to calculate annual values. 
 For each bank, we use its book value of total assets and equity market values in 1992Q4 as 
starting values. Growth rates in total assets are computed as the weighted average quarterly growth 
rate in total assets of the top 19 BHC_BHCs each year using book values as weights. Similarly, growth 
rates in equity market value are computed as the weighted average quarterly growth rate in equity 
market value of the top 19 BHC_BHCs each year using equity market values as weights. Changes in 
leverage are computed as the weighted average of the quarterly leverage ratios of the top 19 
BHC_BHCs each year. 
 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾 calculated for each bank and summed across banks to obtain an aggregate capital 
shortage. The aggregate capital shortage can be interpreted as the funding amount the government 
must be ready to provide to bail out failed banks. We also calculate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾/𝑀𝑉𝐸 for each bank scaled 
by its equity market value and totaled across banks to establish an aggregate value.  
5.0 Hypotheses and Empirical Results 
H1: Following the passage of the Act, the expansion of financial holding companies 
into investment banking activities led to greater risk taking.  
      To test this hypothesis, we compute summary statistics for changes in systemic risk measures 
through time by bank type. The reported results are for risk measure 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆, which defines the 
𝐿𝑅𝑀𝐸𝑆 as the lower bound return that results in a capital loss. Results for 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 are similar 
when the lower bound return imbeds a large market decline.  
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< Insert Figure 6 here.> 
 Figure 5A shows, as expected, for BHCs that did not convert into FHCs, there is no 
meaningful change in the 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 following the passage of the Act. Heighted competition from 
FHCs, however, increased the 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆  of investment banks significantly. The 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆  of 
BHCs that converted into FHCs and significantly expanded their securities underwriting business also 
posted an increase. The increase in 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 is foremost for the S20_FHC group which are the 
largest commercial banks; surpassing the increase for investment banks. Interestingly, investment 
banks exhibit the greatest decline in 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 following the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, the 
decline in 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 was relatively small for the S20_FHC group following the 2008 financial crisis, 
and continued to rise significantly after. 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 is highest for the S20_FHC group.  
 Figure 5B shows that the shares of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 for BHCs that did not convert into 
FHCs declined following the passage of the Act. Heighted competition by FHCs diminished the 
investment bank group share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆.  In contrast, the shares of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 
of BHCs that converted into FHCs and significantly expanded their securities underwriting business 
posted increases. The increase in share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 is foremost for the S20_FHC group 
which are the largest commercial banks; surpassing the share for investment banks. Following the 
2008 financial crisis, the share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 decreased for investment banks but recovered 
in subsequent years. But the share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 increased dramatically for S20_FHCs and 
remains elevated. 
 < Insert Figure 7 here.> 
 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆for the four largest S20_FHC banks and five largest IB_IB investment banks are 
shown in Figure 7. Note the sharp increase in systemic risk following the passage of the Act. Among 
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BHCs, Citigroup had the largest increase; Wells Fargo, the smallest. Among investment banks, Merrill 
Lynch and Morgan Stanley had the highest increase in systemic risk. Interestingly, the two investment 
banks, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, that failed actually had the lowest increase in systemic risk. 
Systemic risk fell in the 2008 financial crisis only to rise in the years following the bailout. Systemic 
risk remains elevated. 
< Insert Table 3 here.> 
 Table 3 reports average 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆and average share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 for selected 
periods by bank type. Differences in average 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆 and average share of aggregate 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑀𝐸𝑆reflect changes in systemic risks from the period prior to the passage of the Act to the: (i) 
period following the passage of the Act; (ii) crisis period; and (iii) post crisis period.  
< Insert Figure 8 here.> 
 From Figure 8 to Figure 10 we apply the baseline and DCC-GARCH simulated 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 
for groups of banks and individual banks, and Table 4 reports average baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆and 
average share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆for selected periods by bank type ( Differences in average 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆and average share of aggregate 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆reflect changes in systemic risks from the 
period prior to the passage of the Act to the: (i) period following the passage of the Act; (ii) crisis 
period; and (iii) post crisis period). Figure 8A graphs total baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 in millions of USD 
by bank type and year. In each quarter, baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is computed for each bank and summed 
across banks to obtain group totals. In Figure 8B, Group totals are summed to obtain the quarterly 
aggregate amount which is used to scale group totals to calculate group shares of 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 . 
Quarterly shares of each group are averaged to obtain annual shares. In Figure 8C, quarterly 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆  is scaled by the market value of equity (MVE) for each bank. Quarterly values are 
summed across banks to obtain quarterly group total. Quarterly total 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆/MEV of each 
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group is averaged to calculate annual averages. In Figure 8A we observe that S20_FHC group 
experienced the highest 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 increase during 2008 financial crisis and remained high for 
around three years post crisis, while BHC_BHC and BHC_FHC also exhibited systemic risk increase 
during the 2008 crisis period, their increasing was much smaller compared with that of S20_FHC 
group. It is not surprising to see that during the crisis BHC_FHC had higher risk increase than 
BHC_BHC, the latter have less exposure to risker investment banking activities. For most of the time, 
Investment banks had higher risk exposure than all other banks, and their risk started to increase since 
2001, peaked and drop earlier than all commercial banks during 2008 financial crisis, while also remain 
high after the crisis. In Figure 8B the pattern shows that, investment banks managed to act earlier than 
commercial banks, either based on their experience or because they were more closely monitor the 
market through daily operation. In terms of the share of total 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆, investment banks took 
up the biggest share throughout the time examined, except during 2008 crisis when almost all 
commercial banks experienced great increasing in the risk, with S20_FHC had the greatest share of 
risk and remained high post crisis. In Figure 8C 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆is scaled by market value of equity, 
investment banks had the highest risk per unit of market value. The scaled 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 should be 
interpreted with caution, because total dollar amount of SRISK matters more in the event when 
government is expected to provide liquidity to the market.  
< Insert Figure 9 here.> 
 In Figure 9 and 10 we look closely on selected individual banks, which are also covered in the 
2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. All three measures (baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 , DCC-
GARCH simulated 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 and DCC-GARCH simulated 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆scaled by market value 
of equity) show the similar conclusion that big banks such as Citi Group, Bank of America, JPMorgan 
Chase, Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley are institutions with the highest systemic risk exposure during 
2008 financial crisis and remain high post crisis. An interesting finding is that Lehman Brothers and 
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Bear Stearns exhibited much higher systemic risk exposure long before the 2008 financial crisis. The 
pattern is stronger under DCC-GARCH simulated 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 approach and even more prominent 
under the measure scaled by market value of equity. The finding here provides some evidence that the 
DCC-GARCH based forecasting technique has some power in predicting troublesome institutions by 
using past one quarter (or one month) daily returns to simulate next quarter (or next month) daily 
returns.  
< Insert Figure 10 here.> 
         Overall, the above discussions show some evidences that after the passage of the Act, banks 
that became financial holding companies (S20_FHC and BHC_FHC) experience increasing systemic 
risk exposure. The period average by type and the difference among the period average reported in 
Table 4 shows the consistency of our findings.  
< Insert Table 4 here.> 
Moreover, we run two robustness checks for our SRISK computation, which are summarized in 
Appendix B.  In the first check (Figure B1.a, Figure B1.b), we compare our monthly baseline 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆estimation with monthly 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆provided by VLAB NYU; In the second check 
(Table B2.a, Table B2.b), we compare our SRISK estimation with SCAP estimated firm level loss. The 
SRISK measure is sensitive to the threshold value applied.  Over all our results are consistent across 
different approaches. Next, we turn to the second hypothesis. 
H2: FHCs engaged in activities with greater systemic risk post-GLBA because 
regulatory restrictions were removed. 
         To test this hypothesis, we compare SRISK (with varied adjustments) for selected BHCs and 
FHCs (Figure 11A, 11B, 11C). We also compute summary statistics for changes in noninterest income 
and trading assets through time by firm type (Table 5, Figure 12A, 12B). Moreover, as robustness 
check we run regression on firm type and time periods to test the change of trading assets and 
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noninterest income (results not reported, consistent with results from summary statistics).  
< Insert Figure 11 here.> 
         In Figure 11A, we first select 19 BHC_BHC banks with the highest market value of equity in 
each quarter, next compute the baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 for each bank for each quarter, then sum up 19 
banks’ 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 within a quarter; For BHC19 group we do not use DCC-GARCH simulated total 
returns because the top 19 BHCs are different in different years (however, 19 FHCs are the same in 
each year, the list is in Appendix C Table C4.). For FHC19 groups, we compute two different versions 
of simulated 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆: 1) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns and original market value 
of equity and book liability and 2) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns and hypothesized 
market value of equity and book liability. 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is computed at bank level for each quarter 
then sum up across all 19 FHC banks. To compute hypothesized market value of equity and book 
liability, we use book total assets and market equity of 1999 Q4 as the starting value for the selected 
19 FHCs, and we assume that the selected FHCs’ book total assets grow at the weighted average 
(BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) quarterly growth rate of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs’ 
book total assets, that the selected FHCs’ market equity grows at the weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ 
market equity as the weight) quarterly growth rate of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs’ market equity, and 
that the leverage ratio (book total liability to book total assets, for computing hypothesized book total 
liability) is weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) quarterly leverage ratio of 
yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs. Not surprising to see that BHC19 has the lowest risk. Comparing the two 
results for FHC19, we observe that if FHCs grow at the growth rate of top BHCs, they will have much 
lower systemic risk exposure even during 2008 financial crisis, and their risk will remain low post crisis. 
This provides some evidence that high growth rate in FHCs drive up their systemic risk exposure 
during and post 2008 financial crisis. 
         Figure 11B shows three different versions of quarterly total 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 for selected 19 FHC 
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banks. All 19 FHC banks are the same in each year. We compute three different versions of simulated 
𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 by using: 1) DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (original total returns as simulation 
inputs) and original market value of  equity and book liability, 2) DCC-GARCH simulated total returns 
(log-trading-assets-adjusted total returns as simulation inputs) and original market value of equity and 
book liability and 3) DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (log-noninterest-income-adjusted total 
returns as simulation inputs) and original market value of equity and book liability. 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆  is 
computed at bank level for each quarter then sum up across all 19 FHC banks. The result shows that 
trading assets and noninterest income have little influence on the systemic risk shifting. Compared 
with the results from Figure 11A, we show some evidence that high growth rate in FHCs has greater 
influence on their systemic risk exposure than does the investment banking activities those banks 
undertaking. As robustness check, in Figure 11C we conduct the similar analysis as in Figure 11B 
except that we also assume that FHCs grow at top BHCs’ growth rate. The results are consistent.  
         Take one step further, we plot the change of trading assets and noninterest income through 
time. Figure 12A shows the yearly average of trading assets at firm level by type. S20_FHC show the 
rapid expansion in trading amount after 1999, and dominate the market since then. Figure 12B shows 
the yearly average of noninterest income at firm level by type, both S20_FHC and BHC_FHC 
experience increasing dollar amount in noninterest income. However, during the 2008 financial crisis, 
S20_FHC noninterest income drop sharply. Summary statistics in Table 5 reconciles with the results 
in Figure 12A and 12B by showing that both S20_FHC and BHC_FHC increase trading assets and 
noninterest income after the passage of the Act.  
< Insert Table 5 here.> 
        Analysis for H2 shows that after the passage of the Act, banks which choose to become financial 
holding companies increase their trading assets and noninterest income, and those banks also show 
higher systemic risk exposure according to different measures. However, the results for the H2 should 
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be interpreted with caution. As we can see from Figure 11A, 11B and 11C, the trading assets adjusted 
or noninterest income adjusted SRISK is very close to baseline SRISK which is not adjusted from the 
effect of trading assets or noninterest income; on the other hand, the SRISK with the hypothesized 
market equity and book liability is significantly different from baseline SRISK. We find some evidence 
that it is the size of banks that matters more than does the trading or noninterest income on the 
systemic risk shifting in banking sector.  
H3: Investment banks’ charter values decreased because of the increased competition. 
   We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for charter value. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for 
Tobin’s Q by type. In each quarter, we first calculate the Tobin’s Q at firm level, take the average by 
type; next, take the average of quarterly results by year. The result shows that overall, investment 
banks’ charter values do not decrease due to competition from commercial banks, especially from 
S20_FHC. Investment banks have the highest Tobin’s Q among the five types of banks, with 
significant decline in Tobin’s Q during financial crisis, and pick up again after 2009. All four types of 
commercial banks have quite similar level of Tobin’s Q around 1, with S20_S20 diverged during 2005 
to 2007. Average Toin’s Q for investment banks is higher than that of commercial banks. Unreported 
regression analysis also shows the similar results. In unreported analysis, we regress Toin’s Q on firm 
type, time period and other control variables; the results are consistent. 
 6.0  Conclusion 
         This paper studies the possible impact of the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act on 
the systemic risk of financial institutions. By examining several systemic risk measures (SRISK, 
∆CoVaR, MES and CoMES, our focus is on SRISK), we find some evidence that banks which had 
section 20 subsidiaries before 1999 and became financial holding companies after 1999 exhibit risk 
increase, and they are more volatile than any other types of banks (except investment banks) during 
2008 financial crisis. Banks which did not have section 20 subsidiaries before 1999 and become 
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financial holding companies experience less risk increase and there is some evidence they benefit from 
the business diversification. Overall, our study shows that the 1999 Act make some big banks take 
more risk (in terms of SRISK), but not all banks follow that path. When market is good, risky banks 
perform better than less risky banks; however, when market is bad, risky banks perform worse than 
less risky banks. Moreover, financial holding companies’ total asset has greater impact on their 
systemic risk contribution than their investment banking activities. We also compute SRISK according 
to Engle (2015) DCC-GARCH simulation approach (with and without hypothesized book total assets 
and market equity) for 20 big banks from Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 2009, the result is 
consistent. 
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Table 1. Quarterly Average in each quarter, count the number of firms and observations for each type; 
then take the average of all quarterly counts. Annual Average Count in each quarter, count the number 
of firms for each type; then take the average of the quarterly count within each year.  
 
 QUARTERLY AVERAGE 
 BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Count 286 72 20 17 34 
NOBS 17,707 4,528 1,229 1,078 2,050 
 ANNUAL AVERAGE COUNT 
YEAR BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
1993 244 44 38 18 28 
1994 266 47 36 17 28 
1995 272 50 34 17 26 
1996 278 52 30 17 27 
1997 280 53 30 17 30 
1998 306 58 26 18 27 
1999 320 66 21 18 30 
2000 321 69 20 17 32 
2001 329 74 18 17 33 
2002 337 74 18 17 38 
2003 348 75 18 17 38 
2004 341 78 17 17 37 
2005 344 81 16 17 40 
2006 297 81 17 17 40 
2007 279 82 17 17 44 
2008 259 84 15 17 44 
2009 257 84 12 17 39 
2010 236 87 12 17 37 
2011 222 87 12 17 35 
2012 276 87 11 17 33 
2013 223 85 11 17 28 
2014 252 84 10 17 28 
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Table 2. The table reports the yearly average of firm level Tobin’s Q by type. We first compute Tobin's 
Q for each bank for each quarter; next, compute the simple average of Tobin's Q of banks in each 
type in each quarter (type quarterly Tobin's Q); finally compute the simple average of the type quarterly 
Tobin's Q for each type for each year. We also compute the average by four periods and compare the 
average difference. 
 
YEAR BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
1993 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.20 
1994 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.11 
1995 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.06 
1996 1.05 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.26 
1997 1.09 1.09 1.13 1.12 1.40 
1998 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.17 1.40 
1999 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.18 1.82 
2000 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.15 1.36 
2001 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.15 1.38 
2002 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.12 1.35 
2003 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.10 1.37 
2004 1.08 1.11 1.43 1.11 2.09 
2005 1.08 1.10 1.98 1.10 2.13 
2006 1.08 1.11 1.94 1.09 2.20 
2007 1.05 1.10 1.91 1.08 1.86 
2008 1.00 1.05 1.39 1.02 1.42 
2009 0.97 1.01 0.96 0.97 1.31 
2010 0.98 1.02 0.96 0.99 1.60 
2011 0.98 1.02 0.97 0.99 1.63 
2012 0.99 1.02 0.98 0.99 1.64 
2013 1.01 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.83 
2014 1.02 1.04 0.99 1.02 1.98 
Tobin's Q BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.36 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 1.06 1.09 1.38 1.11 1.76 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 0.99 1.03 1.21 0.99 1.37 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 1.00 1.03 0.98 1.00 1.73 
Differences in Tobin's Q      
Pre-Crisis   – Pre-GLBA -0.02*** 0.00*** 0.27*** -0.01** 0.40*** 
Crisis         – Pre-GLBA -0.10*** -0.06*** 0.10*** -0.13*** 0.01 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA -0.09*** -0.06*** -0.13 -0.12*** 0.37*** 
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Table 3. Table reports average SRISK
MES
 and average share of aggregate SRISK
MES
 for selected periods 
by bank type. Differences in average SRISK
MES
 and average share of aggregate SRISK
MES
 reflect 
changes in systemic risks from the period prior to the passage of the Act to the: (i) period following 
the passage of the Act; (ii) crisis period; and (iii) post crisis period. *represents significant at 10% level, 
** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
SRISK
MES
 BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 44,161 16,577 89,383 142,810 66,228 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 84,016 75,541 65,941 350,166 204,968 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 51,163 97,102 6,538 501,408 136,137 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 71,349 129,503 3,503 756,559 128,319 
Differences in SRISKMES      
Pre-Crisis   – Pre-GLBA 39,855* 58,963*** -23,442*** 207,356*** 138,740*** 
Crisis         – Pre-GLBA 7,002 80,525*** -82,846*** 358,598*** 69,909*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 27,187** 112,926*** -85,880*** 613,749 62,092*** 
Share of SRISK
MES
 BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 12.22 4.58 24.93 39.69 18.58 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 11.64 9.37 10.87 42.85 25.27 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 6.71 12.81 0.67 64.40 15.40 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 6.51 11.92 0.32 69.80 11.46 
Differences in 
Share of SRISKMES 
     
Pre-Crisis  – Pre-GLBA -0.58 4.79*** -14.06*** 3.17** 6.69 
Crisis        – Pre-GLBA -5.50 8.23*** -24.26*** 24.71** -3.18*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA -5.71 7.34*** -24.61*** 30.11 -7.13 
SRISK
MES
/MVE BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 118.72 20.13 9.67 8.12 14.48 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 180.39 35.91 3.74 6.75 114.03 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 323.2 47.25 4.09 11.45 61.13 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 336.65 68.78 10.35 14.17 106.83 
Differences in 
SRISKMES
 
/MVE 
     
Pre-Crisis  – Pre-GLBA 61.67 15.79 -5.94*** -1.36*** 99.55*** 
Crisis        – Pre-GLBA 204.48*** 27.12*** -5.58*** 3.33 46.65*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 217.93*** 48.66*** 0.68** 6.05 92.35*** 
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Table 4. Table reports average baseline SRISKCoMES and average share of aggregate SRISKCoMES for 
selected periods by bank type. Differences in average SRISKCoMES and average share of aggregate 
SRISKCoMES reflect changes in systemic risks from the period prior to the passage of the Act to the: (i) 
period following the passage of the Act; (ii) crisis period; and (iii) post crisis period. *represents 
significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
SRISK
CoMES
 BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 9 8 150 843 11,012 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 171 13 0 527 27,955 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 9,020 14,969 1,346 118,205 57,308 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 2,697 3,406 56 19,647 40,943 
Differences in SRISKCoMES
 
      
Pre-Crisis   – Pre-GLBA 162*** 6*** -150*** -315 16,942 
Crisis         – Pre-GLBA 9,011*** 14,961*** 1,196*** 117,363*** 46,296*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 2,688*** 3,398*** -94*** 18,804*** 29,930 
Share of SRISK
CoMES
 BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 0.11 0.05 0.21 1.2 98.43 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 4.12 0.07 0 0.84 94.97 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 6.62 5.33 0.95 37.43 49.66 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 5.35 2.39 0.11 10.79 81.36 
Differences in  
Share of SRISKCoMES
 
 
     
Pre-Crisis  – Pre-GLBA 4.01*** 0.02*** -0.21*** -0.36 -3.46*** 
Crisis        – Pre-GLBA 6.52*** 5.28*** 0.74** 36.23*** -48.76*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 5.24*** 2.34*** -0.10*** 9.59*** -17.06*** 
SRISK
CoMES
/MVE BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 0.62 0.24 0.01 0.04 4.02 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 1.18 0.02 0.00 0.01 101.83 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 125.34 7.38 0.81 3.75 52.05 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 106.20 8.06 7.50 0.50 96.59 
Differences in  
SRISKCoMES
 
/MVE 
     
Pre-Crisis  – Pre-GLBA 0.56 -0.22*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 97.81*** 
Crisis        – Pre-GLBA 124.72*** 7.13*** 0.8*** 3.71*** 48.03*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 105.58*** 7.82*** 7.5*** 0.46*** 92.57*** 
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Table 5. Table reports the means and differences in means for trading assets and non-interest income 
by bank type and period. We first compute simple average of trading assets (non-interest income) of 
banks in each type in each quarter (type quarterly average); next compute the simple average of the 
type quarterly average trading assets (non-interest income) for each type for each period we defined; 
finally, compute the differences in means of the four periods. *represents significant at 10% level, ** 
at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
Trading Assets BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 7 33 6,290 13,511 7 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 36 73 5,371 41,524 36 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 5 155 125 74,867 5 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 8 184 13 69,918 8 
Differences in  
Trading Assets 
     
Pre-Crisis   – Pre-GLBA 29*** 40*** -919*** 28,013*** 29*** 
Crisis         – Pre-GLBA -2*** 122*** -6,165*** 61,356*** -2*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 1*** 151*** -6,277*** 56,407*** 1*** 
Noninterest Income BHC_BHC BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
Pre-GLBA  (1996-1998) 4,432 9,590 156,226 310,067 4,432 
Pre-Crisis    (2000-2007) 8,003 56,987 294,294 821,832 8,003 
Crisis          (2008-2009) 3,385 105,717 33,315 1,079,224 3,385 
Post Crisis  (2010-2014) 5,486 121,749 28,749 1,306,499 5,486 
Differences in 
Noninterest Income 
     
Pre-Crisis  – Pre-GLBA 3,571*** 47,398*** 138,068*** 511,765*** 3,571*** 
Crisis        – Pre-GLBA -1,047*** 96,128*** -122,910*** 769,157*** -1,047*** 
Post Crisis – Pre-GLBA 1,054*** 112,159*** -127,476*** 996,432*** 1,054*** 
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Figure 1.  This figure shows the market concentration measurement (HHI) by type and year. In each 
year, for each type of banks we compute HHI of ten 3- month rolling windows; then take the average 
of those ten HHIs within a year to achieve yearly average HHI for each type of banks.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  This figure shows the yearly average of rolling stock return standard deviation. First compute 
stock returns standard deviation for each bank in each 3-month rolling window; next take the simple 
average of the firm level returns standard deviation by type within each 3-month rolling window (type 
level returns standard deviation); finally take the average of ten 3-month rolling window type level 
returns standard deviation in each year by type. 
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Figure 3. This figure shows the yearly average of rolling Carhart 4-factor model residual standard 
deviation. First run Carhart 4-factor regression at firm level by bank type in each 3-month rolling 
window; then take the average of ten 3-month rolling window residual standard deviation in each year 
by type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  This figure shows the yearly average of rolling Carhart 4-factor model market beta. First run 
Carhart 4-factor regression at firm level by bank type in each 3-month rolling window; then take the 
average of ten 3-month rolling window market beta in each year by type. 
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Figure 5.  This figure shows the yearly average of rolling Carhart 4-factor model adjusted R-squared. 
First run Carhart 4-factor regression at firm level by bank type in each 3-month rolling window; then 
take the average of ten 3-month rolling window adjusted R-squared in each year by type. 
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Figure 6. Figure 6A graphs total baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 in millions of USD by bank type and year. In 
each quarter, baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is computed for each bank and summed across banks to obtain 
group totals. In Figure 6B, Group totals are summed to obtain the quarterly aggregate amount which 
is used to scale group totals to calculate group shares of 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆. Quarterly shares of each group 
are averaged to obtain annual shares. In Figure 6C, quarterly 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is scaled by the market 
value of equity (MVE) for each bank. Quarterly values are summed across banks to obtain quarterly 
group total. Quarterly total 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆/MEV of each group is averaged to calculate annual averages. 
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Figure 7. This figure shows the baseline SRISKMES ($) for selected S20_FHC bank in each quarter. The threshold value for MES is the 
stock return that make the firm with zero capital shortfall. 
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Figure 8. Figure 8A graphs total baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 in millions of USD by bank type and year. In 
each quarter, baseline 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is computed for each bank and summed across banks to obtain 
group totals. In Figure 8B, Group totals are summed to obtain the quarterly aggregate amount which 
is used to scale group totals to calculate group shares of 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆. Quarterly shares of each group 
are averaged to obtain annual shares. In Figure 8C, quarterly 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆 is scaled by the market 
value of equity (MVE) for each bank. Quarterly values are summed across banks to obtain quarterly 
group total. Quarterly total 𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑀𝐸𝑆/MEV of each group is averaged to calculate annual averages. 
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Figure 9.  This figure shows the baseline SRISKCoMES ($) for each bank in each quarter. The threshold used for CoMES is the VaR (at 5%) of 
the market returns as specified in equation 14. BOFA, JPMORGAN, CITIGROUP and WELLSFARGO are S20_BHC. BEARSTEARNS, 
MERRILLLYNCH, MORGANSTANLEY, LEHMANBROTHERS and GOLDMANSACHS are IB_IB. 
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Figure 10A.  This figure shows the average of 1000 simulated SRISKCoMES ($) for each selected bank in each quarter. First, apply DCC-
GARCH model to simulate stock returns for each bank, then compute the SRISKCoMES using the simulated returns and bank’s original market 
equity and book liability. Repeat the process for 1000 times for each bank and take the average of 1000 simulated quarterly SRISK for each 
bank. In our DCC-GARCH based SRISKCoMES, the threshold used for CoMES is the VaR (at 5%) of the market returns. 
 
 
 
 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
1
9
9
3
.1
1
9
9
3
.3
1
9
9
4
.1
1
9
9
4
.3
1
9
9
5
.1
1
9
9
5
.3
1
9
9
6
.1
1
9
9
6
.3
1
9
9
7
.1
1
9
9
7
.3
1
9
9
8
.1
1
9
9
8
.3
1
9
9
9
.1
1
9
9
9
.3
2
0
0
0
.1
2
0
0
0
.3
2
0
0
1
.1
2
0
0
1
.3
2
0
0
2
.1
2
0
0
2
.3
2
0
0
3
.1
2
0
0
3
.3
2
0
0
4
.1
2
0
0
4
.3
2
0
0
5
.1
2
0
0
5
.3
2
0
0
6
.1
2
0
0
6
.3
2
0
0
7
.1
2
0
0
7
.3
2
0
0
8
.1
2
0
0
8
.3
2
0
0
9
.1
2
0
0
9
.3
2
0
1
0
.1
2
0
1
0
.3
2
0
1
1
.1
2
0
1
1
.3
2
0
1
2
.1
2
0
1
2
.3
2
0
1
3
.1
2
0
1
3
.3
2
0
1
4
.1
2
0
1
4
.3
Figure 10A. Average of 1000 DCC-GARCH Simulated SRISKCoMES
AmEx Regions USB FifthThird KeyCorp
BofA PNC BB&T State St BNYM
Bear Stearns JPMC Citi MorganStanley Wells
Lehman Brothers SunTrust CapOne Goldman MetLife
1.BANKOFAMERICA
2.CITIGROUP
3.JPMORGAN
4.WELLS FARGO
5.MORGANSTANLEY
LEHMAN BROTHERS BEAR STEARNS
  
3
9
 
Figure 10B.  This figure shows the average of 1000 simulated SRISKCoMES ($) scaled by market value of equity for each selected bank in each 
quarter. First, apply DCC-GARCH model to simulate stock returns for each bank, then compute the SRISKCoMES using the simulated returns 
and bank’s original market equity and book liability. Repeat the process for 1000 times for each bank and take the average of 1000 simulated 
quarterly SRISK for each bank. The result showed are simulated SRISK scaled by each bank’s market value of equity. In our DCC-GARCH 
based SRISKCoMES, the threshold used for CoMES is the VaR (at 5%) of the market returns. 
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Figure 11A. For BHC19 group, we first select 19 BHC_BHC banks with the highest market value of equity in a quarter, next compute the 
baseline SRISKCoMES for each bank for each quarter, then sum up 19 banks’ SRISK within a quarter; For BHC19 group we do not use DCC-
GARCH simulated total returns because the top 19 BHCs are different in different years (19 FHCs are the same in each year). For FHC19 
groups, we compute two different versions of simulated SRISKCoMES : 1) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns and original market 
value of  equity and book liability  and 2) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns and hypothesized market value of equity and book 
liability. SRISK is also computed at bank level for each quarter then sum up across all 19 FHC banks. To compute hypothesized market value 
of equity and book liability, we use book total assets and market equity of 1999 Q4 as the starting value for the selected 19 FHCs, and we 
assume that the selected FHCs’ book total assets grow at the weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) quarterly growth 
rate of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs’ book total assets, that the selected FHCs’ market equity grows at the weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ 
market equity as the weight) quarterly growth rate of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs’ market equity, and that the leverage ratio (book total liability 
to book total assets, for computing hypothesized book total liability) is weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) 
quarterly leverage ratio of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs. 
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Figure 11A. Three Groups of 19 Banks' Quarterly Total SRISKCoMES ($) 
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Figure 11B. This figure shows three different versions of quarterly total SRISKCoMES ($) for selected 19 FHC banks. All 19 FHC banks are the 
same in each year. We compute three different versions of simulated SRISKCoMES : 1) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (original 
total returns as simulation inputs) and original market value of  equity and book liability, 2) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (log 
trade amount adjusted total returns as simulation inputs) and original market value of equity and book liability and 3) using DCC-GARCH 
simulated total returns (log noninterest income adjusted total returns as simulation inputs) and original market value of equity and book 
liability. SRISK is computed at bank level for each quarter then sum up across all 19 FHC banks.  
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Figure 11C. This figure shows quarterly total SRISKCoMES ($) for selected 19 FHC banks (same 19 banks in each year). We compute three 
different versions of simulated SRISKCoMES : 1) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (original total returns as simulation inputs) and 
hypothesized market value of  equity and book liability, 2) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns (log trade amount adjusted total 
returns as simulation inputs) and hypothesized market value of equity and book liability and 3) using DCC-GARCH simulated total returns 
(log noninterest income adjusted total returns as simulation inputs) and hypothesized market value of equity and book liability. SRISK is 
computed at bank level for each quarter then sum up across all 19 FHC banks. To compute hypothesized market value of equity and book 
liability, we use book total assets and market equity of 1999 Q4 as the starting value for the selected 19 FHCs, and we assume that the selected 
FHCs’ book total assets grow at the weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) quarterly growth rate of yearly top 19 
BHC_BHCs’ book total assets, that the selected FHCs’ market equity grows at the weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ market equity as the 
weight) quarterly growth rate of yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs’ market equity, and that the leverage ratio (book total liability to book total assets, 
for computing hypothesized book total liability) is weighted average (BHC_BHCs’ book total assets as the weight) quarterly leverage ratio of 
yearly top 19 BHC_BHCs.  
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Figure 12A. We first compute the simple average of trading assets of banks in each type in each quarter 
(type quarterly average trading), then compute the simple average of the type quarterly average trading 
by type and year.  
 
 
Figure 12B. We first compute the simple average of noninterest income of banks in each type in each 
quarter (type quarterly average noninterest income), then compute the simple average of the type 
quarterly average noninterest income by type and year.  
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Figure 12C. This figure shows the quarterly summation of each component of total assets for 19 FHCs (in Millions of $). “cash” is Cash and 
balances due from depository institutions; “sec” is Securities (from Schedule HC-A); “ffsrr” is Federal funds sold and securities purchased 
under agreements to resell; “netloans” is Loans and lease financing receivables; “trade” is Trading assets; “premfixed” is Premises and fixed 
assets (including capitalized leases); “oreo” is Other real estate owned; “invconsubs” is Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and 
associated companies; “intang” is Intangible assets; and “othassets” is Other assets. 
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Figure 12D. This figure shows the quarterly summation of each component of non-interests income for 19 FHCs (in Millions of $). qfidu is 
quarterly fiduciary activity income; qservdep is quarterly services charges on deposit accounts; qtrad is quarterly trading revenue; qiabu is 
quarterly investment banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting fees and commissions; qvencap is quarterly venture capital fee income; 
qinsure is quarterly underwriting income from ins and reins activities; qothins is quarterly income from other ins and rein activities; qnetserv 
is quarterly income form net servicing fees; qsecurit is quarerly net securitization income. 
 
  
 
 
 
-30,000
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1
9
9
3
.0
1
1
9
9
3
.0
3
1
9
9
4
.0
1
1
9
9
4
.0
3
1
9
9
5
.0
1
1
9
9
5
.0
3
1
9
9
6
.0
1
1
9
9
6
.0
3
1
9
9
7
.0
1
1
9
9
7
.0
3
1
9
9
8
.0
1
1
9
9
8
.0
3
1
9
9
9
.0
1
1
9
9
9
.0
3
2
0
0
0
.0
1
2
0
0
0
.0
3
2
0
0
1
.0
1
2
0
0
1
.0
3
2
0
0
2
.0
1
2
0
0
2
.0
3
2
0
0
3
.0
1
2
0
0
3
.0
3
2
0
0
4
.0
1
2
0
0
4
.0
3
2
0
0
5
.0
1
2
0
0
5
.0
3
2
0
0
6
.0
1
2
0
0
6
.0
3
2
0
0
7
.0
1
2
0
0
7
.0
3
2
0
0
8
.0
1
2
0
0
8
.0
3
2
0
0
9
.0
1
2
0
0
9
.0
3
2
0
1
0
.0
1
2
0
1
0
.0
3
2
0
1
1
.0
1
2
0
1
1
.0
3
2
0
1
2
.0
1
2
0
1
2
.0
3
2
0
1
3
.0
1
2
0
1
3
.0
3
2
0
1
4
.0
1
2
0
1
4
.0
3
Figure 12D. Quarterly Non-interest Income Components
(Total of 19 FHCs' in each quarter)
qtrad_sumof19fhc qfidu_sumof19fhc qservdep_sumof19fhc qiabu_sumof19fhc qvencap_sumof19fhc
qinsure_sumof19fhc qothins_sumof19fhc qnetserv_sumof19fhc qsecurit_sumof19fhc
  
4
6
 
Figure 12E. This figure shows the quarterly summation of non-interests income and net interest income for 19 FHCs (in Millions of $), 
and the quarterly average ratio of total quarterly non-interest income to quarterly net interest income. qnetint is quarterly net int income; 
qnonint is quarterly total nonint income. 
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Appendix A 
 
 We define capital buffer, tCB  , as the bank’s excess equity: 
  
              
 
t t t
t t t
CB S kA
S k D S
 
  
                          (1) 
where tS  is the market value of the bank’s equity at time t ; tA , is the market value of the bank’s total 
assets at time t ; and k , is the macro-prudential required capital as a fraction of total assets. In normal 
times, excess equity is positive; but in times of crisis, can become negative. Recognizing that liabilities 
cannot be renegotiated, and in the short-run banks cannot adjust their macro-prudential required 
capital, the bank’s capital buffer at time t   is: 
 
 
 
   
 
t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t
CB S k D S
S k D S S S
S S k D S S R
S CS
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


 



  
      
      
 
                                                            (2) 
where  1t tR r     denotes the total return on equity, and tCS  , if positive denotes a capital 
shortage and a capital surplus otherwise.  
 Assume ln tR z       where z  is a standard normal variable with density and 
cumulative density functions  z and  z  respectively. The distribution of returns ln tR   
associated with tR C   is described by a truncated standard normal with density function, 
 |z z d  .    
 
                
 1t t
t
kD k S
C
S
 
                                                     (3) 
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| exp
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z z d z
d d

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 
                                              (4) 
where 
 
ln C
d

 

                                                                       (5) 
From (2) and (3)
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      1 |t t t t t tE CS kD k S S E R R C                                                          (6) 
and from (3),  
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Substituting (7) into (6), 
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 Define , ,1m t m tR r     and assume ln tR   and ,ln m tR   are bivariate normal, 
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where  2 2 21    . ,ln m t m m mR z        and  , mz z  are bivariate standard normal 
variables with correlation  . Let C  be such that  ,Pr * 0.05m tR C   , or equivalently, 
   ,Pr * * 0.05m tR C d    , where 
 
 
ln *
* m
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C
d
 
 

                                                                           (10) 
The distribution of returns ,ln m tR   associated with  , *m tR C  is described by a truncated standard 
normal with density function,  | *m mz z d  : 
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It follows that 
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Substituting (11) into (5), 
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Appendix B 
 
We run robustness check by comparing our SRISK computations with two other sources of results: 
firm level loss estimation from 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program and monthly SRISK 
from Vlab NYU website (lower bound value as 40%).  
 
B1. Compare with SCAP estimated firm level loss 
For 17 banks: 1) regress our risk measures on SCAP estimated loss at firm level, and 2) compute 
Person, Spearman and Kendall correlation between Baseline SRISKCoMES and SCAP estimated loss. 
Our SRISK estimations have positive correlation with SCAP estimated loss, and the results are 
statistically significant.  
 
B2. Compare with VLAB NYU SRISK estimation 
Compute monthly SRISK index for selected banks, and compare the results with the monthly SRISK 
on Vlab of NYU for those same banks. Our monthly estimation captures the same two high SRISK 
periods: 2008 financial crisis and post-crisis period around 2011. The only different is that during the 
period between two SRISK peaks, their SRISK estimation decrease much slower than our estimation. 
One possible reason is that in their approach, they use GARCH-DCC model with simulation and 
looking at cases when market drop 40%. In our monthly estimation, the top four highest SRISK banks 
(in descending order) are Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo, which are 
the same four highest SRISK banks (and in the same descending order) of Vlab NYU monthly results.  
  
  
5
1
 
Figure B1. This figure shows the DCC-GARCH simulated monthly SRISKCoMES from VLAB NYU website.  In Engle (2015) paper, the 
threshold for CoMES is the market returns drop by 10%. The threshold value for CoMES is varied.   
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Figure B1. Individual Bank Monthly SRISK From VLAB NYU Website 
(Based on DCC-GARCH model, conditioning on market drop greater than 40%, banks of S20_FHC group)
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Table B2.a. Baseline SRISKCoMES Measure Robustness Check – Compare with SCAP Estimated Loss 
First, in each rolling 3-month window, for each bank compute the correlation coefficient between SCAP estimated loss and log of baseline 
SRISKCoMES (see equation 11); then take the average of all rolling windows within each year across all banks. P-value is provided in panel B. 
This analysis included 18 out of 19 SCAP banks and another two investment banks we selected. Banks list for the comparison are in 
Appendix C. (SCAP is abbreviation of Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 2009). Y_04: Total Loss estimates (Before purchase 
accounting adjustments); Y_10: Securities (AFS and HTM); Y_11: Trading & Counterparty; Y_10n11: Sum of Y_10 and Y_11; 
ScaleY_10n11: Divide Y_10n11 by Risk-Weighted Assets. 
 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) Yearly Average 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) Yearly Average 
Kendall's Tau Rank Correlation Coefficient  
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) Yearly Average 
Year 
Ln 
Y_04 
Ln 
Y_10 
Ln 
Y_10n11 
Scale 
Y_10n11 
Year 
Ln 
Y_04 
Ln 
Y_10 
Ln 
Y_10n11 
Scale 
Y_10n11 
Year 
Ln 
Y_04 
Ln 
Y_10 
Ln 
Y_10n11 
Scale 
Y_10n11 
1993 0.59 0.57 0.47 0.51 1993 0.55 0.61 0.45 0.48 1993 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.44 
1994 0.66 0.35 0.65 0.68 1994 0.63 0.54 0.65 0.63 1994 0.51 0.27 0.53 0.57 
1995 0.64 0.38 0.56 0.58 1995 0.68 0.45 0.59 0.57 1995 0.44 0.28 0.46 0.47 
1996 0.68 0.53 0.58 0.60 1996 0.65 0.69 0.57 0.59 1996 0.51 0.40 0.47 0.51 
1997 0.59 0.29 0.53 0.57 1997 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.50 1997 0.49 0.22 0.46 0.49 
1998 0.71 0.49 0.68 0.70 1998 0.66 0.57 0.59 0.59 1998 0.55 0.37 0.55 0.58 
1999 0.67 0.50 0.64 0.65 1999 0.64 0.59 0.60 0.60 1999 0.54 0.38 0.55 0.54 
2000 0.72 0.45 0.66 0.67 2000 0.71 0.55 0.67 0.67 2000 0.55 0.32 0.56 0.58 
2001 0.74 0.41 0.69 0.64 2001 0.76 0.42 0.68 0.56 2001 0.56 0.29 0.58 0.52 
2002 0.69 0.32 0.66 0.66 2002 0.66 0.39 0.64 0.58 2002 0.50 0.26 0.55 0.55 
2003 0.69 0.29 0.63 0.60 2003 0.69 0.31 0.64 0.53 2003 0.50 0.21 0.53 0.47 
2004 0.64 0.32 0.70 0.67 2004 0.69 0.35 0.70 0.60 2004 0.47 0.24 0.58 0.54 
2005 0.64 0.17 0.63 0.61 2005 0.62 0.19 0.64 0.56 2005 0.48 0.13 0.52 0.48 
2006 0.59 0.13 0.55 0.57 2006 0.57 0.17 0.58 0.55 2006 0.41 0.10 0.45 0.47 
2007 0.64 0.00 0.49 0.50 2007 0.53 -0.04 0.53 0.54 2007 0.50 0.02 0.40 0.42 
2008 0.50 0.15 0.44 0.45 2008 0.44 0.11 0.44 0.43 2008 0.33 0.12 0.34 0.35 
2009 0.69 0.33 0.70 0.68 2009 0.78 0.26 0.75 0.67 2009 0.52 0.25 0.58 0.55 
2010 0.63 0.49 0.70 0.68 2010 0.80 0.43 0.74 0.65 2010 0.48 0.36 0.59 0.54 
2011 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.61 2011 0.80 0.60 0.65 0.58 2011 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.48 
2012 0.74 0.58 0.65 0.64 2012 0.91 0.56 0.76 0.74 2012 0.55 0.43 0.54 0.52 
2013 0.75 0.53 0.64 0.62 2013 0.85 0.50 0.70 0.60 2013 0.57 0.40 0.53 0.49 
2014 0.85 0.30 0.69 0.66 2014 0.87 0.28 0.71 0.60 2014 0.67 0.21 0.57 0.51 
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Table B2.b. Baseline SRISKCoMES Measure Robustness Check – Compare with SCAP Estimated Loss 
In each rolling 3-month window, for each bank compute the correlation coefficient between SCAP estimated loss and log of baseline 
SRISKCoMES; This table shows how many of the correlations are significant at least at 10%, or 5%, or 1%. The threshold used for CoMES 
is the VaR (at 5%) of the market returns as specified in equation 11. (SCAP is abbreviation of Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 2009). 
Y_04: Total Loss estimates (Before purchase accounting adjustments); Y_10: Securities (AFS and HTM); Y_11: Trading & Counterparty; 
Y_10n11: Sum of Y_10 and Y_11; ScaleY_10n11: Divide Y_10n11 by Risk-Weighted Assets. 
 
Total 
Corr 
Count 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) 
 P-value Count (alpha = 10%, 5%, 1%) 
Pearson Product-moment Correlation Coefficient 
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) 
P-value Count (alpha = 10%, 5%,1%) 
Kendall's Tau Rank Correlation Coefficient  
Corr (SCAP_loss, LnSRISK) 
P-value Count (alpha = 10%, 5%, 1%) 
 lnY_04  
<= 10 
lnY_04  
<= 5 
lnY_04  
<= 1 
lnY_04  
<= 10 
lnY_04 
 <= 5 
lnY_04  
<= 1 
lnY_04  
<= 10 
lnY_04 
 <= 5 
lnY_04  
<= 1 
262 
234 214 148 230 211 144 234 197 108 
lnY_10 
 <= 10 
lnY_10  
<= 5 
lnY_10  
<= 1 
lnY_10  
<= 10 
lnY_10  
<= 5 
lnY_10  
<= 1 
lnY_10  
<= 10 
lnY_10  
<= 5 
lnY_10  
<= 1 
91 63 22 114 80 37 91 54 17 
lnY_10n11  
<= 10 
lnY_10n11  
<= 5 
lnY_10n11 
 <= 1 
lnY_10n11  
<= 10 
lnY_10n11 
 <= 5 
lnY_10n11  
<= 1 
lnY_10n11  
<= 10 
lnY_10n11  
<= 5 
lnY_10n11  
<= 1 
221 207 117 218 184 115 222 190 81 
scaleY_10n11 <= 
10 
scaleY_10n11 
<= 5 
scaleY_10n11 
<= 1 
scaleY_10n11 <= 
10 
scaleY_10n11 <= 
5 
scaleY_10n11 
<= 1 
scaleY_10n11 
<= 10 
scaleY_10n11 <= 
5 
scaleY_10n11 
<= 1 
222 206 109 218 174 61 222 198 36 
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Table B3. shows the number of mergers and acquisitions between 1999-2014; the acquiring banks' year end and year beginning total assets, 
and the difference. Number in Panel B are in millions of dollars. Number in parentheses are negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Number of Mergers and Acquisitions 
year FifthThird Wells JPMC BB&T USB Wachovia Fleetboston  KeyCorp BofA SunTrust Regions PNC Citi  CapOne State St BNYM 
sum by 
year 
1999 1 2                             3 
2000 1 5 1 5 1                       13 
2001 1 5   5 2 1 1                   15 
2002   2   2   1                     5 
2003       1       1                 2 
2004     1 1 1 1   1 1 1 4           11 
2005                       1 2 1     4 
2006       2   2     1   1   2 1     9 
2007     1   2             2 1   1 2 9 
2008   1           1   1   2         5 
2009     1                 2         3 
2010                                 0 
2011   7                             7 
2012   5                             5 
2013         1       1       2       4 
2014                                 0 
sum by 
firm 
3 27 4 16 7 5 1 3 3 2 5 7 7 2 1 2 95 
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Table B3 (cont.) 
 
Panel B. Acquirer Total Assets' Difference Between Year End and Year Beginning 
end - 
begin 
FifthThird Wells JPMC BB&T USB Wachovia Fleetboston  KeyCorp BofA SunTrust Regions PNC Citi  CapOne State St BNYM 
sum by 
year 
1999 12,668 15,627               28,295 
2000 4,267 54,324 309,243 15,859 5,806            389,500 
2001 25,169 35,143  11,530 84,054 76,282 24,119          256,297 
2002  41,690  9,347  11,387           62,424 
2003    10,250    (816)         9,434 
2004   386,317 10,042 5,818 92,292  6,506 375,622 33,477 35,890      945,964 
2005            12,250 9,936 34,954   57,140 
2006    12,181  186,366   169,373  58,584  390,281 61,446   878,232 
2007   210,627  18,383       37,122 303,313  35,552 94,633 699,630 
2008  734,197      5,664  9,564  152,117     901,541 
2009   (143,063)         (21,171)     (164,234) 
2010                 0 
2011  55,739               55,739 
2012  109,101               109,101 
2013     10,166    (107,009)    15,722    (81,121) 
2014                 0 
sum 
by 
firm 
42,105 1,045,821 763,124 69,209 124,227 366,327 24,119 11,354 437,986 43,041 94,474 180,317 719,252 96,400 35,552 94,633 4,147,940 
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Table B3 (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. Acquirered Banks' Total Assets (incomplete list) 
year JPMC BB&T USB Wachovia Fleetboston KeyCorp SunTrust Regions PNC Citi CapOne BofA State St BNYM 
sum by 
year 
2000 281,681 9,664 686            292,032 
2001  8,508 77,585 74,828 39,668          200,590 
2002  5,087             5,087 
2003  11,335             11,335 
2004 299,303 2,907  53,888  777 24,211 82,130       463,217 
2005         5,950 971,457 23,193    1,000,600 
2006  2,332      54,285   58,889 61,862   177,368 
2007         20,304    17,058 169,846 207,208 
2008      2,854 1,833  146,937      151,624 
sum by 
firm 
580,984 39,834 78,271 128,717 39,668 3,630 26,044 136,415 173,191 971,457 82,082 61,862 17,058 169,846 2,509,060 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1. Bank Examples by Type 
 
S20_FHC IB_IB 
B B & T Corp Bear Stearns Companies Inc 
B O K Financial Corp Blackrock Inc 
Bank of America Corporation Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
Bank of New York Company, Inc Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc 
Bankers Trust Corp Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 
Citigroup Inc Morgan Stanley Group Inc 
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc T D Ameritrade Holding Corp 
Fifth Third Bancorp Fleet Mortgage Group Inc 
Huntington Bancshares Inc Dean Witter Discover & Co 
JP Morgan Chase & Co Nationwide Financial Services Inc 
Keycorp Jefferies Group Inc New 
PNC Bank Corp Credit Suisse Group 
State Street Corp Nomura Holdings Inc 
Suntrust Banks, Inc Prudential Financial Inc 
Synovus Financial Corp Interactive Brokers Group Inc 
US Bancorp M F Global Ltd 
Umpqua Holdings Corp T D Waterhouse Group Inc 
Wells Fargo & Co New Penson Worldwide Inc 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C2. Banks List for SRISK Comparison with Vlab NYU Estimation 
 
BHC_FHC S20_S20 S20_FHC IB_IB 
American Express Co Commerce Bancshares Inc Bank of America Corp A.g. Edwards 
Ameriprise Financial Inc National City Corporation Bank of New York Mellon Corp Bear Stearns 
Capital One Financial Corp Wachovia Bank BB&T Corp Blackrock Inc 
Comerica Inc  Citigroup Inc Cbot Holdings 
Franklin Resources Inc  Fifth Third Bancorp Cme Group Inc 
M&T Bank Corp  Huntington Bancshares Inc Goldman Sachs Group Inc 
Metlife Inc  JP Morgan Chase & Co Legg Mason Inc 
Northern Trust Corp  Keycorp Lehman Brothers 
Regions Financial Corp  PNC Financial Services Group Inc Merrill Lynch 
Unionbancal  State Street Corp Morgan Stanley 
Zions Bancorporation  Suntrust Banks Inc Nymex 
  Synovus Financial Corp Prudential Financial Inc 
  US Bancorp T Rowe Price Group Inc 
    Wells Fargo & Co Td Ameritrade Holding Corp 
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Table C3. Banks List for SRISK Comparison with Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
   Company Type Full Company Name 
Included in SCAP  
Loss Estimation 
1 AmEx bhc_fhc American Express Company yes 
2 CapOne bhc_fhc Capital One Financial Corporation yes 
3 MetLife bhc_fhc MetLife, Inc. yes 
4 Regions bhc_fhc Regions Financial Corporation yes 
5 BofA s20_fhc Bank of America Corporation yes 
6 BB&T s20_fhc BB&T Corporation yes 
7 BNYM s20_fhc The Bank of New York Mellon Corp yes 
8 Citi  s20_fhc Citigroup, Inc. yes 
9 FifthThird s20_fhc Fifth Third Bancorp yes 
10 JPMC s20_fhc JPMorgan Chase & Co. yes 
11 KeyCorp s20_fhc KeyCorp yes 
12 PNC s20_fhc PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. yes 
13 State St s20_fhc State Street Corporation yes 
14 SunTrust s20_fhc SunTrust Banks, Inc. yes 
15 USB s20_fhc U.S. Bancorp yes 
16 Wells s20_fhc Wells Fargo & Company yes 
17 Goldman  ib_ib The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. yes 
18 Morgan Stanley ib_ib Morgan Stanley yes 
19 Bear Stearns ib_ib Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. SEC filing 10Q, 2008 
20 Lehman Brothers ib_ib Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. SEC filing 10Q, 2008 
 
The last two are realized loss computed as book total assets – book total liability from SEC filling 
2008. We tried both include and exclude those two firms, the results are consistent. 
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Table C4. Nineteen Banks’ List for Figure 11A, 11B and 11C.  
   Company Type Full Company Name 
Included in SCAP  
Loss Estimation 
1 AmEx bhc_fhc American Express Company yes 
2 CapOne bhc_fhc Capital One Financial Corporation yes 
3 MetLife bhc_fhc MetLife, Inc. yes 
4 Regions bhc_fhc Regions Financial Corporation yes 
5 BofA s20_fhc Bank of America Corporation yes 
6 BB&T s20_fhc BB&T Corporation yes 
7 BNYM s20_fhc The Bank of New York Mellon Corp yes 
8 Citi  s20_fhc Citigroup, Inc. yes 
9 FifthThird s20_fhc Fifth Third Bancorp yes 
10 JPMC s20_fhc JPMorgan Chase & Co. yes 
11 KeyCorp s20_fhc KeyCorp yes 
12 PNC s20_fhc PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. yes 
13 State St s20_fhc State Street Corporation yes 
14 SunTrust s20_fhc SunTrust Banks, Inc. yes 
15 USB s20_fhc U.S. Bancorp yes 
16 Wells s20_fhc Wells Fargo & Company yes 
17 Bank One bhc_fhc Bank One Corporation no 
18 Fleetboston  bhc_fhc Fleetboston Financial Corporation no 
19 Wachovia bhc_fhc Wachovia Corporation no 
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Paper 2: 
Skill in Bond Mutual Fund Returns: A Bootstrap Approach 
Lifa Huang, Wayne Y. Lee, and Craig G. Rennie 
University of Arkansas 
1.0    Introduction 
 In contrast to equities markets, bond markets are larger in size and involve securities with issue 
specific terms and imbedded options that trade over-the-counter with lower liquidity. Bond mutual 
fund managers have the utmost opportunity to add value through market timing and/or security 
selection. 2  Government bond portfolio managers can select issues with differing duration and 
convexity, and corporate bond fund managers can select from a range of credit default risks. Further, 
all bond fund managers have the option to time portfolio adjustments to changing expectations about 
future interest rates and yield spreads. In our view, the bond market offers the best chance of 
observing whether mutual fund managers possess skill. 
 Existing evidence on actively managed bond and equity mutual funds suggests managers 
generate returns that do not cover costs. Blake et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1995), and Ferson et al. (2006) 
find U.S. bond mutual funds generate negative risk-adjusted performance net of expenses. Using a 
nine-factor model to capture timing and non-linearities in bond mutual fund returns, Chen et al. (2010) 
also conclude that most U.S. actively managed bond mutual funds underperform benchmarks net of 
                                                 
 2For example, at the end of 2016, U.S. bond market debt was $39.4 trillion (The Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) estimates outstanding U.S. bond market debt at the end of 2016 as: Municipal $3.8 trillion; Treasury 
$13.9 trillion; Mortgage Related $8.9 trillion; Corporate $8.5 trillion; Federal Agencies $2.0 trillion; Money Market $0.9 
trillion; and Asset Backed $1.3 trillion. http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx), compared to U.S. stock market 
capitalization of $26.0 trillion (http://www.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-stock-exchanges-by-size/). There 
are an estimated 150,000 individual U.S. debt securities (Xtrakter’s CUPID database has information on over 150,000 
debt securities), compared to only 19,000 U.S. stocks among which only about 4,333 U.S. stocks are publicly listed and 
actively traded (World Federation of Exchanges. Of an estimated 19,000 U.S. stocks mid-2016, only 4,333 were publicly 
listed, according to J.P. Morgan). Fewer analysts follow bonds than stocks, bond ratings tend to be infrequently updated 
or not rated at all, and many bonds are illiquid, especially when placed under Rule 144A. 
 61 
 
expenses.  
 Carhart (1997) finds that U.S. equity mutual funds do not consistently outperform, and many 
consistently underperform, benchmarks. Kosowski et al. (2006) argue that parametric tests cannot 
reliably assess performance persistence when the distribution of 𝛼 is non-normal with fat tails. Using 
bootstrapping to generate simulated returns, Kosowski et al. (2006) show that some equity mutual 
fund managers possess skill, particularly among growth equity funds. In Kosowski et al. (2006), 
however, model residual errors are bootstrapped to create simulated demeaned fund returns.3 This 
procedure assumes estimated model slope parameters are reasonably stable. Moreover, as Fama and 
French (2010, p.1939) note, independent bootstraps of residual errors for each fund do not address 
cross-correlations in 𝛼 when benchmark models do not capture all common variation in fund returns. 
Using demeaned returns to bootstrap simulated 𝑡(𝛼), Fama and French (2010) show that the few U.S. 
actively managed equity funds that do outperform do so because of luck, and not skill. 
 In this paper, we investigate whether bond mutual fund managers possess skill using a 
bootstrap approach. We employ a sample of 564 consolidated U.S. open-end actively managed 
domestic bond mutual funds with monthly returns covering the period January 1999 to December 
2016.4 Data are obtained from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database and Morningstar 
Direct. A Fama and French (1993) bond returns model, combined with factors to account for timing 
and non-linearities from Chen et. al. (2010), are used to estimate actual and bootstrapped precision-
adjusted total and selection 𝛼 on gross and net returns.  
 We address three questions. First, do actively managed bond mutual funds generate average 
precision-adjusted 𝛼 on returns net of expenses? Are the precision-adjusted 𝛼 on net returns primarily 
                                                 
 3See Kosowski et al (2006), equation (4), p. 2561, and p. 2567 on residual error bootstrapping as baseline tests. In a second 
approach, both residual errors and factor returns are bootstrapped (p. 2582) to construct fund returns but model estimated 
slope parameters are used. 
 4Our sample starts January 1999 because we consolidate bonds using the CRSP Survivorship-Free Mutual Funds database 
variable CRSP_CL_GRP. This variable is only available starting August 1998.  
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attributable to selection or timing? Second, how are precision-adjusted 𝛼 on net returns affected by 
assets under management (AUM), and asset specialization in government or corporate issues, for 
government by duration, and for corporate by credit ratings? Is selection or timing more or less 
successful on government bond mutual funds that do not report average effective duration and 
corporate bond mutual funds that do not report average credit ratings? Is the performance of active 
bond fund management better in the short-run? Third, what is the economic value created or 
destroyed from active bond fund management?  
 Comparing percentile sorted actual against bootstrapped precision-adjusted 𝛼s, we are first to 
show that bond mutual fund managers possess skill. The top half of all actively managed bond mutual 
funds generate significant positive precision-adjusted 𝛼 on returns net of expenses. For bond mutual 
funds in the upper 10%, precision-adjusted 𝛼 from timing is relatively larger in magnitude and more 
important than from selection. Distributions of precision-adjusted 𝛼 are non-normal and exhibit fat 
tails. Parametric tests bias against outperformance; negative (positive) precision-adjusted 𝛼s are more 
(less) likely to be statistically significant. Moreover, bootstrap simulations are sufficiently robust to 
uncertainty about true 𝛼.  
 We find significant precision-adjusted 𝛼 , 𝑡(𝛼) , on net returns. Significant 𝑡(𝛼)  can be 
attributed to selection and timing for government bond funds. Timing is more important than 
selection for corporate bond funds. Selection matters most for bond mutual funds with assets under 
management (AUM) > $750M; and timing, for AUM<$750M. Results on AUM hold for government 
as well as corporate bond mutual funds. Timing generates significant 𝑡(𝛼) on short (0-5 year) duration 
government bond funds, and on corporate bond mutual funds in the AA, BBB, and No Rating 
categories. Further, timing is also the source of significant precision-adjusted 𝛼 in short three-year 
horizons. 
 Lastly, we estimate active management creates an economic value (EV) of 30 basis points (bps) 
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on aggregate AUM. 24 bps can be attributed to timing and 6 bps to selection. But for large bond 
mutual funds with AUM>$750M, selection contributes an EV of 42 bps on AUM; timing reduces EV 
by -13 bps on AUM. EV on corporate bond funds is similar; 32 bps and 3 bps from timing and 
selection. But on government bond funds, EV of 26 bps is from selection, timing generates a negative 
EV of 6 bps. 
 Further, the top 10% of bond mutual funds contribute the most to EV. The contribution to 
EV from timing is more important than selection on all bond funds, government and corporate, 
except for bond mutual funds with more than $750M in AUM. On aggregate AUM, the top 2% and 
10% of bond mutual funds add 34 bps and 19 bps respectively from timing; 17 and 7 bps respectively, 
from selection. The pattern of EV on corporate bond funds is similar. The top 2% and 10% generate 
36 bps and 37 bps from timing respectively; 27 bps and 7 bps respectively from selection. The EV 
from timing for the top 2% and 10% of government bond funds of 20 bps and 12 bps respectively is 
also higher compared to 16 bps and 9 bps respectively from selection.  
2.0   U.S. Bond Mutual Fund Manager Performance 
2.1   Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds  
 Existing literature on actively managed mutual funds predominantly focus on equity mutual 
fund returns. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) show that past winners continue to win, and past losers 
continue to lose. Constructing a factor mimicking long-short portfolio to proxy for momentum, 
Carhart (1997) finds little evidence of return persistence among actively managed equity mutual funds, 
especially after loads, expense fees, and turnover. In a sample of 3,549 mutual funds from 1990-2003, 
Huij and Derwall (2008) substantiate economically significant out-of-sample predictive return between 
top and bottom decile funds ranked on prior 𝛼 greater than 3.5% annually. Cuthbertson et al. (2010) 
show that 5% of top performing actively managed UK and US equity mutual funds exhibit positive 
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𝛼 . Past winners persist when rebalancing occurs at least annually using Bayesian sorting rules. 
Transaction costs marginalize economic significance; past losers remain losers. 
 Return persistence centers on short run performance. But abnormal performance may be 
longer-run and parametric tests cannot reliably assess long-run performance when the distribution of 
precision-adjusted 𝛼  is non-normal with fat tails. Kosowski et al. (2006) examine U.S. actively 
managed equity mutual fund monthly net returns over the period 1975 through 2002. Using 
bootstrapped demeaned returns as the benchmark, they find significant positive precision-adjusted 𝛼, 
𝑡(𝛼), for the top 10% of equity mutual funds. Abnormal performance is particularly strong for growth 
funds. Actively managed equity fund managers who generate an 𝛼 ≥ 4%, add approximately $1.2 
billion in wealth annually. However, they also show most fund managers underperform, destroying an 
estimated an annual $1.5 billion in wealth. 
 The bootstrap procedure used in Kosowski et al. (2006), however, assumes the model 
consistently captures all of the common variation in returns over time. Bootstrapping monthly 
demeaned returns across funds rather than independently by funds, Fama and French (2010) find little 
evidence that active equity mutual fund manager generates positive precision-adjusted 𝛼  on net 
returns. 
2.2    Cross-sectional Variation in Bond Mutual Fund Returns  
 Using a bond return model, which include returns on a value-weighted CRSP index and 
Lehman Aggregate Bond Index, as well as differences in returns on a Lehman High-Yield vs. 
Intermediate Government Index and Lehman GNMA vs. Intermediate Government Index, 
Gutierrez, Jr., et al. (2009) report that four-year persistence in actively managed corporate bond fund 
returns account for about 15% of the risk premium of investment grade corporates over the risk free 
rate. Moreover, they find no evidence that performance is adversely affected by fund size. Sorting on 
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prior short-run 𝛼s, Huij et al. (2008) report that a substantial persistence in bond fund returns is 
attributable to time-varying exposure to risk factors. Winner minus loser portfolio returns is a proxy 
for bond fund changes in risk exposure. 
 To account for timing in bond market returns, Chen et al. (2010) consider nine factors: short 
interest rate; term slope; curvature; credit spread; mortgage spread; liquidity spread; U.S. dollar; equity 
values; and equity volatility. Additionally, the squares of these variables are used to proxy for non-
linearities in bond fund returns. They find most bond mutual fund managers underperform 
benchmarks after expenses. Using security holdings of corporate bond mutual funds and bond fund 
characteristics described in Gutierrez, Jr., et al. (2009), Cici and Gibson (2012) find weak evidence of 
fund manager ability to time, but no evidence of superior security selection ability. Using characteristic 
timing measures (Daniel, et. al., 1997) based on proportionate weights invested in sectors, credit 
quality, and maturity, Moneta (2015) finds that active bond mutual fund managers perform sufficiently 
well to earn their fees and costs. 
3.0   Sample Selection and Data 
3.1 Sample 
 Our sample of U.S. open-end actively managed domestic bond mutual fund monthly returns 
is drawn from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database. This database provides 
information on a monthly basis for all types of open-end mutual funds, including bond funds, starting 
December 1961. To be included in our study, different classes of the same fund are consolidated by 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database variable CRSP_CL_GRP. This variable is available from August 1998, 
and we have data through the end of 2016. Because we also perform tests based on 3-year windows, 
we selected the sample period as January 1999 through December 2016. Mutual fund observations 
with more than one share class are combined to form a single consolidated mutual fund-month 
observation, similar to Kosowski et al. (2006) and French (2008). For each fund, we estimate 
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consolidated fund returns by summing value-weighted returns of each share-class, whether load, no-
load, or institutional, where value-weights are based on the proportion of each share-class to total net 
assets at month start. 
 The CRSP Style Code combines mutual fund data based on codes from each source at four 
levels of increasing granularity. Relevant CRSP Style Codes include: at Level 1, Fixed Income (I); at 
Level 2, Fixed Income Corporate (IC), and Fixed Income Government (IG); at Level 3, Fixed Income 
Corporate Quality (ICQ), Fixed Income Corporate Duration (ICD), and Fixed Income Government 
Duration (IGD); at Level 4, Fixed Income Corporate Quality High Quality (ICQH), Fixed Income 
Corporate Quality Medium Quality (ICQM), Fixed Income Corporate Quality High Yield (ICQY), 
Fixed Income Corporate Duration Short (ICDS), Fixed Income Corporate Duration Intermediate 
(ICDI), Fixed Income Government Duration Short (IGDS), and Fixed Income Government 
Duration Intermediate (IGDI).  
 We exclude Fixed Income Municipal (IU), Fixed Income Government TIPS (IGT), Fixed 
Income Money Market (IM), Fixed Income Foreign (IF) funds, Mixed Fixed Income and Equity (M), 
and Other Mortgage-Backed (OM) mutual funds, because factors other than those typically used to 
explain variation in the cross-section of bond returns, such as taxes, inflation, foreign exchange rates, 
and the determinants of equity returns, likely apply to such funds. We also exclude index bond mutual 
funds because our focus in this paper is on actively managed mutual bond funds. Our sample retains 
mutual funds that fit CRSP Style Codes Bonds (I), Corporate Bonds (IC), Government Bonds (IG), 
Investment Grade Corporate Bonds (ICQH), and High Yield Corporate Bonds (ICQY).     
 We construct our sample using an approach that mitigates potential mutual fund incubation 
bias; i.e., too many funds with short histories. As in Fama and French (2010), we delete funds with 
AUM less than $5 million (in 2006 dollars). We require each fund to have at least 12 observations 
throughout the sample period with observations from at least 5 different years because we employ a 
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10-factor model to capture timing and non-linearities in bond fund returns. We include all funds with 
assets under management (AUM) > $5 million, and stratify AUM differences using three discrete 
categories: $5-$250 million, $250-$750 million, and greater than $750 million.  
 We merge CRSP Mutual Funds and Morningstar Direct data to obtain additional information 
on benchmarks. Average effective duration is a proxy for maturity used in prior literature, and average 
credit rating, a proxy for credit default risk. Unlike prior literature, we do not drop observations for 
government bond funds with missing average duration or corporate bond funds with missing average 
credit rating. These funds, which account for about one third of the entire sample, can be 
systematically different from others, for example, in the use of derivatives to hedge interest rate or 
default risk.5  
<Insert Table 1 here.> 
3.2   Summary Statistics 
 Table I shows the impact of the number of observations and data coverage on the sample. 
The total number of bond mutual funds is reduced by about one-third; similarly, for government and 
corporate bond mutual funds. Although the total number of funds at the beginning and end of the 
sample period is unchanged, there is a noticeable rise (decline) in the number of government 
(corporate) bond funds. Average AUM in 2006 dollars increased about 70% over the 18-year sample 
period. Differences between value and equal weight returns indicates gross and net returns are lower 
for larger funds across the entire sample as well as for government and corporate bond funds.  
<Insert Table 2 here.> 
 Summary statistics on monthly gross and net returns across all funds, government and 
                                                 
 5The decision to report credit rating and duration to Morningstar by fund managers is voluntary.  
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corporate, are reported in Table 2. As expected, average (median) returns and standard deviations are 
higher on corporate than government bond mutual funds, government bond mutual funds with longer 
average duration, and corporate bond mutual funds with lower average credit rating. 
 Differences between mean and median returns suggest bond mutual fund returns are 
positively skewed across the entire sample. Returns on government bond mutual funds are also 
positively skewed, but negatively, on short duration (0-5 years) government bond mutual funds. 
Returns on corporate bond mutual funds are negatively skewed, but positively, on high investment 
grade (AAA) corporate bond mutual funds.  
3.3   Regression Framework 
 To examine whether actively managed bond mutual funds create significant total 𝛼 on net 
returns from selection and timing, we employ the Fama-French (1993) 5-factor bond returns model.  
Summary statistics and factor correlation matrix are reported in Table 2. Observe that MKTRF, the 
differences between monthly value-weighted CRSP returns and lagged one-month T-Bill rates are 
strongly correlated with the other four factors. As in Fama and French (1993), we use RMO, the 
orthogonal projection of MKTRF on the other factors, as the proxy for excess market return. 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +𝑚𝑖𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
  
In (1), MKTRF is the value-weighted CRSP monthly return minus lagged one-month T-Bill rate. RMO 
is the orthogonal linear projection of MKTRF on the other four factors. SMB is the difference in 
monthly return between stocks with market capitalization above and below the NYSE median. HML 
is the difference in monthly return between stocks with book-to-market equity ratios in the top and 
bottom 30% of the NYSE. TERM is the difference in monthly returns between long-term treasuries 
and one-month lag T-Bill rate. DEF is the difference in monthly return between corporate and long-
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term treasury bonds. 
 We considered the nine factors proposed in Chen et al. (2010) to account for timing and non-
linearities in bond mutual fund returns. Conditioning variables, equity volatility and price-to-dividend 
are demeaned and lagged values are interacted with TERM and DEF. Squared terms are used to 
capture non-linearity. Bivariate correlations and stepwise regressions are used to narrow the list to the 
best five factors. The selected factors are combined with the original five factors in Fama and French 
(1993) to construct a 10-factor bond fund return model for selection. 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑖 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +𝑚𝑖𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝑑𝑖𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 
                                  +𝛾1𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡
2 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡
2 + 𝛾3𝐸𝑄𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛾4 (
𝑃𝑅𝐶
𝐷𝐼𝑉
)
𝑡−1
∙  𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑡 
                                     +𝛾5 (
𝑃𝑅𝐶
𝐷𝐼𝑉
)
𝑡−1
∙  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡   +𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
In (2), the square of TERM and DEF capture non-linearities. The conditioning variables, equity 
volatility and price/dividend ratio, EQ VOLATILITY and PRC/DIV, capture timing. EQ 
VOLATILITY is the one-month lag demeaned CBOE implied volatility index (VIX-OEX). 
PRC/DIV is an equity market valuation factor measured as the one-month lag demeaned 
price/dividend ratio for the CRSP value-weighted index, capture timing. 
<Insert Table 3 here.> 
 The first two rows of Table 3 report the equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) 
average excess returns across all funds, governments, and corporates. For EW returns, annualized 
average excess gross returns, CONST*12: Gross Returns, is 1.3% across all funds, 1.2% and 1.6% for 
governments and corporate bond funds respectively. EW average gross returns are statistically 
significant across all funds and government bond funds, and weakly significant for corporate bond 
funds. For EW returns, annualized average excess net returns, CONST*12: Net Returns, are positive 
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but not statistically significant. Similarly, annualized VW average gross returns are positively but weakly 
significant across all funds and government funds, and insignificant for corporate bond funds. 
Annualized VW average excess net returns are positive but not statistically significant. Results suggest 
bond mutual funds can generate positive gross returns but not returns net of expenses.  
 TERM coefficients and associated t-statistics suggest TERM generates the highest and most 
significant average monthly excess returns. For the 5-factor model, from 0.330 percent cross all bonds 
to 0.302 for governments to 0.365 for corporates. DEF coefficients suggest DEF is second-highest, 
generating 0.203 percent for all bonds, to 0.090 for governments and 0.409 for corporates. Result is 
consistent with our expectation that DEF is more important in explaining corporate bond fund returns 
than government bond fund returns. RMO is third-highest, generating 0.025 percent for all bonds and 
0.054 for corporates, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, the RMO coefficient is 
not statistically significant for government bond funds. This is consistent with the view that equity 
risk will most affect corporate returns. VW slope coefficients for TERM, DEF, and RMO are similar 
to those for EW, only slightly larger in magnitude.  
 For the 10-factor model, TERM coefficients and related t-statistics again suggest TERM 
generates the highest and most significant average excess returns. For EW returns, from 0.366 across 
all bond mutual funds, to 0.332 for governments, and 0.422 for corporates. DEF and RMO remain 
second and third highest in importance, positive and highly significant. Magnitudes and statistical 
significance are similar for VW returns. 
 Market timing variables also matter. As expected EQ VOLATILITYt-1 is a negative and 
statistically significant. PRC/DIVt-1 interaction with TERM is positive and statistically significant. 
Magnitudes are similar for EW and VW excess returns None of the squared variables (TERM2 or 
DEF2), are statistically significant. 
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4.0   Bootstrap Approach 
 To test that realized (actual) 𝛼s in fund returns are nonzero, we bootstrap simulated returns 
which have the properties of fund returns, except that a fund’s actual 𝛼 is set to zero for every fund. 
For the 5- and 10-factor model, we estimate an 𝛼 for each fund using monthly observations over the 
sample period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2016 as a proxy for its true 𝛼. For each bond mutual 
fund, estimated 𝛼s are subtracted from monthly returns to obtain demeaned monthly returns. In 
subsequent discussion, we examine the impact of uncertainty about true 𝛼 on bootstrap simulations.  
 Using demeaned monthly fund returns, a simulation run is a random sample (with 
replacement) of 216 months, drawn from the 216 calendar months of January 1999 to December 
2016. In each simulation run, we estimate bootstrapped 𝛼s for each fund using the 5- or 10-factor 
model, dropping funds that do not have the requisite number of observations needed for the 
regressions. Each simulation run produces a cross-section of bootstrapped 𝑡(𝛼)s.  
 Our simulation runs maintain the same number of months.6 Because a simulation run is the 
same random sample of months for all funds, the simulations capture the cross-correlation of fund 
returns and its effects on the distribution of 𝑡(𝛼). Additionally, the joint sampling of fund and 
explanatory returns captures any correlated heteroskedasticity of the explanatory returns and 
disturbances of a benchmark model. Further, because a fund may not be in the sample over the entire 
January 1999 to December 2016 period, the distribution of 𝑡(𝛼) will depend on the number of months 
funds are in a simulation run through its degrees of freedom. That is, distributions of 𝑡(𝛼) for funds 
that are oversampled in a simulation run will have more degrees of freedom (and thinner extreme tails) 
than the distributions of actual 𝑡(𝛼) on observed fund returns. The focus on 𝑡(𝛼) rather than 𝛼 
controls for differences in precision due to differences in residual variance and in the number of 
                                                 
 6See Fama and French (2010, p.1925). Kosowski et al. (2006) introduce a potential bias by simulating funds rather than 
months.  
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months that funds are in a simulation run. Over- and under-sampling of fund returns within a 
simulation run should also balance out in the 10,000 runs used in our inferences. 
 Note that setting true 𝛼  equal to zero on gross and net fund returns implies different 
assumptions about skill into the tests. For net returns, setting true 𝛼 to zero assumes managers have 
sufficient skill to generate expected returns that cover all costs. In contrast, setting true 𝛼 to zero in 
gross returns assumes managers have just enough skill to produce expected returns that cover all costs 
except those report in the form of expense ratios.  
4.1   Distribution of Simulated vs. Actual t(α): All Bond Mutual Funds  
 We employ two benchmark return models on 10,000 bootstrap simulations of monthly bond 
fund gross and net returns assuming true 𝛼 is zero to estimate a precision-adjusted 𝛼s for each fund. 
We compare average simulated 𝑡(𝛼)  with actual 𝑡(𝛼)  on gross and net returns, the percent of 
simulated 𝑡(𝛼)s that are below actual 𝑡(𝛼)s, and the parametric probability that a statistically positive 
(negative) actual 𝑡(𝛼) indicates good (bad) performance. 
 The Fama and French 5-factor model of bond fund returns is used to capture the precision-
adjusted 𝛼 from timing and selection. The second is a 10-factor model, which combines the 5-factor 
model with select factors from Chen et. al. (2010) to proxy for timing and non-linearites in bond fund 
returns, captures the precision-adjusted 𝛼 from selection. Our bootstrap analysis initially focuses on 
all bond funds. Subsequently, we examine the potential effects on 𝑡(𝛼) of asset specialization in 
government or corporate bonds, assets under management (AUM), average effective duration for 
governments, and average credit rating for corporates, as well as short-run horizons.  
<Insert Table 4 here.> 
 Table 4 reports simulated and actual precision-adjusted 𝛼, 𝑡(𝛼), at each percentile across all 
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bond mutual funds sorted by 𝑡(𝛼). Results in columns 1 to 4 are for the 5-factor model using gross 
returns. For example, at the first percentile, average simulated 𝑡(𝛼) of -2.58 is worse than actual 𝑡(𝛼) 
of -1.84. Moreover, 85.1% of simulated observations are worse than actual. Based on bootstrap results, 
active fund management reduces the magnitude and likelihood of negative 𝑡(𝛼). The parametric p-
value at the first percentile, which shows negative 𝑡(𝛼) of -1.84 to be statistically significant, yields an 
opposite inference about the value of active fund management. At the 40th percentile, actual 𝑡(𝛼) of 
1.73 clearly beats an average simulated 𝑡(𝛼) of -0.36, and 100% of simulated 𝑡(𝛼)s are less than actual. 
But the parametric p-value fails to identify the superiority of actual over simulated 𝑡(𝛼).  
 Results in columns 9 through 12 for the 5-factor model using net returns confirm that 
parametric tests bias against finding outperformance. Negative 𝑡(𝛼)s are more likely to be statistically 
significant, and positive 𝑡(𝛼)s are less likely to be statistically significant. At the first percentile, an 
actual 𝑡(𝛼) of -3.27 is worse than average simulated 𝑡(𝛼) of -2.58, and only 16.9% of simulated 
observations are worse than actual. At this percentile, the parametric p-value correctly identifies actual 
as bad performance. But at the 20th through 50th percentile, p-values fail to recognize outperformance. 
Actual 𝑡(𝛼)s are positive and the percentage that simulated 𝑡(𝛼) is less than actual is at least 99.6%. 
At the 60th through 99th percentile, parametric tests correctly show that actual 𝑡(𝛼) are positive and 
statistically significant.  
 In short, five-factor model show there is positive and significant precision-adjusted 𝛼 on gross 
returns at all percentiles, and on a net returns basis, from the top 10th through 99th percentiles. 
Importantly, Table 4 shows parametric tests produce ‘false negatives’. Negative 𝑡(𝛼)s are more likely 
to be statistically significant, and positive 𝑡(𝛼)s, less likely to be statistically significant.     
 Results for the 10-factor model on gross returns in columns 5 through 8, and on net returns, 
in columns 13 through 16, corroborate prior conclusions. On gross returns, actual 𝑡(𝛼) exceeds 
simulated 𝑡(𝛼) at all percentiles except the 4th and 5th percentiles. A % simulated less than actual of 
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80% implies that actual 𝑡(𝛼)  is four times more likely to be greater than simulated 𝑡(𝛼) . Note, 
however, that parametric statistics incorrectly imply bad performance in the bottom 1st through 4th 
percentiles, and does not detect good performance in the 10th through 40th percentiles. On net returns, 
actual 𝑡(𝛼) exceeds simulated 𝑡(𝛼) in the 50th through 90th percentiles, where actual 𝑡(𝛼) is four times 
more likely to be greater than simulated 𝑡(𝛼) . But parametric statistics fail to identify good 
performance.  
 In short, 10-factor model results indicate that selection generates significant 𝑡(𝛼) on gross 
returns in the 10th to 99th percentile of bond mutual funds, and on net returns in the 50th to 90th 
percentiles of bond mutual funds. Parametric statistics understate outperformance. Statistically 
significant negative 𝑡(𝛼)s in the 1st to 4th percentile of bond mutual funds on gross returns, and in the 
1st to 10th percentile of bond mutual funds on net returns, falsely imply bad performance. Statistically 
insignificant positive 𝑡(𝛼) in the 10th to 40th percentile of bond mutual funds on gross returns, and 
50th to 70th percentiles of bond mutual funds on net returns, fail to detect good performance.  
4.2   Uncertainty about True α 
 Our bootstrap simulations are predicated on the assumption that a fund’s realized (actual) 𝛼 
is a proxy for its true 𝛼. To assess the impact of this assumption, we repeat simulations with random 
injections of 𝛼 into each fund’s demeaned 5- or 10-factor benchmark returns. Specifically, in each 
simulation run, we randomly draw an 𝛼 from a normal distribution with mean 0 and annual standard 
deviation of 𝜎. Because more diversified funds may have less leeway to generate true 𝛼, the randomly 
drawn 𝛼 is scaled by the residual standard error from the fund’s 5- or 10-factor benchmark regressions 
to the average standard error from the same benchmark regressions for all funds. We add the scaled 
𝛼 to the fund’s demeaned 5-factor or 10-factor benchmark returns.  
 We then draw a random sample (with replacement) of 216 months, and for each fund, we 
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estimate 5- or 10-factor regressions to compute 𝑡(𝛼). Effectively, the simulations use returns that have 
the properties of actual fund returns, except each fund’s realized (actual) 𝛼 is replaced with an 𝛼 drawn 
from a known distribution of true 𝛼 that is normal with mean zero and annual standard deviation 𝜎. 
We do 10,000 simulation runs, and each fund gets a new drawing of 𝛼 in each run. To examine power, 
we vary the annual standard deviation of true 𝛼, 𝜎, from 0.25% to 1.75%, in steps of 0.25%. For the 
5- and 10-factor benchmark, the annual standard error of individual fund 𝛼 estimates is 1.56% and 
1.38% respectively. The annual standard error of simulated 𝛼 for the 5- and 10-factor benchmark is 
1.25% per year and 1.22% respectively.  
<Insert Table 5 here.> 
 Table 5 shows the cross-section of  𝑡(𝛼) estimates for actual net returns at each percentile 
from Table 3. For each value of 𝜎 , the table also reports the average  𝑡(𝛼)  estimates as well as 
percentages that simulated 𝑡(𝛼) are less than actual 𝑡(𝛼) at the same percentiles from the 10,000 
simulation runs. We use these results to make inferences about the amount of dispersion in true 𝛼 
that can be considered too extreme. Specifically, we ask what standard deviation 𝜎  of true 𝛼  is 
necessary make the cross-section of average simulated 𝑡(𝛼) estimates similar to those for actual fund 
returns. Alternatively, what standard deviation 𝜎 of true 𝛼 is needed to alter our inferences about the 
likelihood that average simulated 𝑡(𝛼)s are less than actual 𝑡(𝛼)s from the percentages of simulated 
𝑡(𝛼)s less than actual 𝑡(𝛼)s. Our particular interest are in values of 𝜎 that match the extreme tails of 
𝑡(𝛼)  estimates for actual net returns. Because the normality assumption for true 𝛼  is an 
approximation, we should not expect a single value of 𝜎 to completely capture the tails of the 𝑡(𝛼) 
estimates for actual net returns. 
 From Table 3, note that for net returns using a 5-factor benchmark, a 𝜎 of 0.50% and 1.00% 
is necessary to make the cross-section of simulated 𝑡(𝛼) at the lower and upper tails approximate the 
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actual 𝑡(𝛼) respectively. At these threshold values, simulated is worse than actual at the lower tail; i.e. 
the %Simulated<Actual 𝑡(𝛼) are consistent with the likelihood that simulated 𝛼 is two to four times 
more likely to be less than actual 𝛼 at the lower tail. But at the upper tail, the differences between 
simulated and actual can be due to random chance. A 𝜎 of 1.50% is necessary to make simulated 
better than actual in the upper tail; i.e. %Simulated<Actual 𝑡(𝛼) are consistent with the likelihood that 
simulated 𝛼 is at least four times more likely to be higher than actual 𝛼 in the upper tail. This is not 
significantly different from the annual standard error of individual fund 𝛼  estimates of 1.56%. 
Moreover, take note that for normally distributed net returns with mean 0 and standard deviation 𝜎, 
only 16.7% of funds will have true net return 𝛼 greater than 𝜎 per year. 
 Similarly, for the 10-factor benchmark, a 𝜎  of about 0.50% makes differences between 
simulated and actual 𝛼 at the lower tail attributable to random chance; at 𝜎 of 0.75%, simulated 𝛼 is 
about 4 times more likely to be lower than actual 𝛼 at the lower tail. A 𝜎 between 0.50% and 0.75%, 
makes differences between simulated and actual 𝛼 at the upper tail attributable to random chance; at 
𝜎 of 1.00%, simulated 𝛼 is about 4 times more likely to be higher than actual 𝛼 at the upper tail. 
 For the 5-factor benchmark, the combined standard deviation of 𝛼 from measurement error 
and upper bound on the dispersion in true 𝛼 of 1.50% at the upper tail is 1.95% per year (about 0.16% 
per month). The likelihood that simulated 𝛼 is higher than the estimated cross-sectional average 𝛼 of 
1.03% is 30%. For the 10-factor benchmark, the combined standard deviation of 𝛼 from measurement 
error and upper bound on the dispersion in true 𝛼 of 0.75% at the upper tail is 1.43% per year (about 
0.12% per month). The likelihood that simulated 𝛼 is higher than the estimated cross-sectional average 
𝛼 of 0.40% is 39%. The bootstrap simulations have significant power. 
4.3   Distribution of Simulated vs. Actual t(α): Asset Specialization and AUM 
 To assess potential effects of asset specialization and fund size on bond mutual fund 
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performance, we focus on net returns. For asset specialization, we differentiate between government 
and corporate bond mutual funds. Among government bond mutual funds, we examine short (0-5 
years), intermediate (5-10 years), long (10-30 years), and missing average effective duration funds. 
Among corporate bond mutual funds, we stratify by credit rating: AAA, AA, A, BBB, Low Grade, 
and No Rating funds. AAA denotes corporate mutual funds with average credit ratings of AAAs 
(AAA to AAA- if rated by S&P, or Aaa if rated By Moody’s), AA (AA+ to AA-, or Aa1 to Aa3), A 
(A+ to A-, or A1 to A3), B (BAA+ to BBB-, or Baa1 to Baa3), and LG (BB+ or lower, or Ba1 or 
lower). Missing effective duration and no rating funds are fund-months where Morningstar Direct 
does not report average duration or credit rating. For fund size, we stratify funds by AUM: small 
($250M≥AUM>$5M), medium ($750>AUM> $250M), and large (AUM> $750 million) funds.  
<Insert Table 6 here.> 
 Actual and average simulated precision-adjusted 𝛼 for government and corporate bond mutual 
funds by percentile are reported in Table 6. For government bond funds, the 5-factor model shows 
significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) from the 30th to 99th percentile, and the 10-factor model, from the 40th to 98th 
percentile. Timing and selection in government bond mutual funds generate significant positive 
precision-adjusted 𝛼 . Magnitudes of 𝑡(𝛼)  suggest, however, that selection is less important. For 
corporate bond funds, the 5-factor model shows significant positive 𝑡(𝛼)  from the 50th to 99th 
percentile. Timing is more important than selection in corporate bond mutual funds. 
<Insert Table 7 here.> 
 Actual and average simulated precision-adjusted 𝛼 for bond mutual funds stratified by AUM 
are reported in Table 7. The 5-factor model shows significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) from the 30th to 99th 
percentile across all fund sizes. The 10-factor model, in the 90th percentile for small AUM funds, and 
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40th to 97th percentile for large AUM funds. Timing is important across all fund sizes. Selection is 
relatively unimportant for small and medium AUM funds, and more important for large AUM funds. 
<Insert Table 8 here.> 
 Actual and average simulated precision-adjusted 𝛼 for bond mutual funds stratified by AUM 
for government and corporate bond mutual funds are reported in Table 8. For government bond 
mutual funds, significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) for the top 10% of large AUM funds come from timing and 
selection. For the top 10% of small AUM funds significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) come primarily from timing. 
Selection is less important for the top 10% of medium AUM funds.  
 For corporate bond mutual funds, significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) for the top 10% of large AUM 
funds comes from timing and selection. For the top 10% of small AUM funds significant positive 
𝑡(𝛼) come primarily from timing. Selection is less important for the top 10% of medium AUM funds.  
  Actual and average simulated precision-adjusted 𝛼  for government bond mutual funds 
categorized by short, medium, long, and missing duration are reported in Appendix Table 2. There 
are significant positive 𝑡(𝛼) from timing only for the top 10% of short duration government bond 
funds. In the bottom 10% of long duration bond mutual funds, selection detracts from performance.  
 Actual and average simulated precision-adjusted 𝛼  for corporate bond mutual funds 
categorized by AAA, AA, A, BBB, Low Grade, and No Rating are reported in Appendix Table 3. 
Only the top 10% of corporate bond mutual funds in the AA, BBB, and No Rating categories show 
significant positive 𝑡(𝛼), and for these categories of corporate mutual funds, outperformance can be 
attributed to timing. 
4.4   Distribution of t(α) for Simulated vs. Actual Bond Mutual Funds: 3-Year Horizons  
 A criticism of prior literature is the focus on the persistence of short-run returns (e.g. Carhart, 
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1997) to draw conclusions about fund manager performance (Kosowski et al. ,2006; Fama and French, 
2010). To assess the impact of horizon, we partition our sample period into three-year non-
overlapping sub-periods of 36 months. Using our 5- and 10-factor benchmark models, three-year 
actual 𝛼s are estimated for each bond mutual fund. Estimated 𝛼s are subtracted from monthly returns 
in each three-year sub-period to obtain demeaned monthly returns for each three-year sub-period over 
the entire sample period. The simulated returns have the properties of fund returns, except that a 
fund’s actual three-year 𝛼 is set to zero for every fund in each of the 3-year sub-periods.  
 Using demeaned monthly fund returns, a simulation run are six random samples (with 
replacement) of 36 months, drawn from sub-periods of 36 calendar months over the period January 
1999 to December 2016. In each simulation run, and for each fund, we estimate bootstrapped 𝛼s over 
each sub-period using the 5- or 10-factor benchmark models, dropping funds that do not have the 
requisite number of observations needed for the regressions. Each simulation run produces a cross-
section of bootstrapped 𝑡(𝛼)s..  
<Insert Table 9 here.> 
 Table 9 reports simulated and actual 𝑡(𝛼) by percentile for all bond mutual funds, bond funds 
stratified by AUM, as well as government and corporate bond funds. Panel A reports results for 5-
factor model, and Panel B for the 10-factor model. The top 10% of funds generate significant positive 
𝑡(𝛼)s for all bond mutual funds, bond funds stratified by AUM, as well as government and corporate 
bond funds, from timing.  
4.5   Economic Value from Active Management 
 At each percentile (Pct) sorted by 𝑡(𝛼), Sim 𝑡(𝛼) is the average value of annualized alpha in 
10,000 simulations using a 5-factor and 10-factor model on net returns. Cumulative AUM is the 
aggregate total amount at each percentile. At each percentile, economic value (EV) is computed as the 
 80 
 
triple product of the annualized standard error of 𝛼, differences between actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼), 
and incremental AUM at each percentile. and aggregated across percentiles. Cumulative EV aggregates 
EV from 99th to 1st percentile and expressed as a percentage of cumulative AUM in basis points. 
<Insert Table 10 here.> 
 Overall, timing is a more important source of EV for all bond mutual funds, government and 
corporate bond mutual funds; and selection, for large AUM bond mutual funds. As a % of aggregate 
AUM, EV of 24 bps is from timing, and 6 bps from selection. EV of 31.9 bps on AUM from timing 
is highest for corporate bond mutual funds; and -5.5 bps on AUM is lowest for government bond 
mutual funds. EV of 2.9 bps and 41.9 bps on AUM from selection is lowest for corporate bond funds, 
and highest for bond mutual funds with AUM>$750M respectively. The bottom 10% of bond mutual 
bond funds, which have the smallest AUM, contribute the least to EV. Except for government and 
bond mutual funds with AUM>$750M, the top 10% of bond mutual funds contribute the most to 
EV.     
 5.0.   Concluding Remarks 
 Using a bootstrap approach on U.S. open end actively managed domestic bond mutual funds 
between January 1999 and December 2016, this paper examines whether bond mutual fund managers 
possess skill. Using a 5-factor and 10-factor benchmark model, we assess the impact of skill from 
timing and selection. Additionally, we consider the effect of specialization in government or corporate 
bonds, assets under management, as well as, returns over short three-year horizons.   
 The top 10% of all bond mutual funds generate significant precision-adjusted alpha 𝑡(𝛼) from 
timing and selection. Timing is more important than timing for all bond mutual funds, government 
and corporate bond mutual funds, as well as bond mutual funds with AUM < $750M. The 
contribution of selection is more important than timing across all bond mutual funds, both 
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government and corporate bond mutual funds, but only for the largest bond mutual funds with 
AUM> $750M. Bond mutual funds generate significant precision-adjusted alpha 𝑡(𝛼) from timing on 
short three-year horizons. Economic value (EV) by the top 10% of bond mutual funds is 19.8 bps 
and 6.5 bps on AUM from timing and selection respectively. EV from timing of 36.6 bps is highest 
for the top 10% of corporate bond mutual funds, and from selection of 25.7 bps, is highest for the 
top 10% of bond mutual funds with AUM>$750M.   
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Table 1: Number, Assets Under Management, Equal and Value Weighted Returns of Bond Mutual Funds.  This table reports the 
number, average assets under management (AUM), equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) gross and net monthly returns of open-
end actively managed bond mutual funds over the sample period January 1999 to December 2016. Different classes of the same fund are 
consolidated by AUM using the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) Mutual Funds Database variable CRSP_CL_GRP. Funds 
that reach at least $5 million in AUM (in 2006 dollars) are included. Net returns are approximate percent returns received by investors, defined 
as monthly net return minus lagged one-month T-Bill rate, where gross returns are monthly net returns plus annual expense ratio/12.@ Gross 
and net returns are annualized and expressed as percentages. Panel A reports results for all funds, Panel B for governments, and Panel C for 
corporates. 
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Number of 
Bond Funds 
Average AUM 
($Mil) 
Bond Funds 
EW  
Gross Returns 
EW  
Net Returns 
VW  
Gross Returns 
VW  
Net Returns 
 ≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
≥ 1 obs 
≥ 12 obs  
5 yrs 
data 
 
Panel A: All Bond Mutual Funds (Governments and Corporates)     
All Years: 1999-
2016 
895 571 918.4 919.7 3.60 3.61 2.85 2.86 3.28 3.29 2.69 2.67 
1999-
2001 
464 316 685.2 671.0 3.48 3.72 2.62 2.87 1.24 1.19 0.51 0.38 
2-
2004 
431 362 620.2 643.9 4.85 4.82 4.01 3.97 5.43 5.46 4.65 4.67 
5-
2007 
364 344 773.2 787.9 0.71 0.69 -0.08 -0.10 0.79 0.78 0.14 0.13 
8-
2010 
457 399 1,040.8 1,062.1 5.50 5.32 4.77 4.61 5.03 4.87 4.46 4.31 
1-
2013 
453 381 1,226.6 1,272.2 3.95 3.97 3.29 3.31 4.09 4.18 3.60 3.70 
4-
2016 
407 319 1,164.4 1,080.8 3.11 3.14 2.51 2.51 3.13 3.23 2.76 2.84 
Panel B: Government Bond Mutual Funds     
All Years: 1999-
2016 
508 345 827.9 845.6 3.11 3.13 2.39 2.42 2.89 2.85 2.35 2.28 
1999-
2001 
281 189 636.7 638.7 3.67 3.88 2.83 3.05 1.53 1.25 0.85 0.44 
2-
2004 
244 212 613.4 618.0 4.10 3.98 3.28 3.16 4.71 4.75 3.96 3.98 
5-
2007 
223 215 648.1 652.7 0.76 0.71 0.00 -0.05 0.82 0.80 0.24 0.23 
8-
2010 
278 257 933.3 952.2 4.51 4.40 3.83 3.74 4.64 4.60 4.16 4.12 
1-
2013 
280 254 1,155.6 1,181.7 3.17 3.23 2.54 2.61 3.32 3.32 2.89 2.89 
4-
2016 
270 223 980.3 1,030.2 2.44 2.59 1.86 2.01 2.33 2.37 1.97 2.01 
Panel C: Corporate Bond Mutual Funds     
All Years: 1999-
2016 
387 226 1,079.8 1,055.2 4.44 4.51 3.64 3.69 3.86 4.00 3.20 3.32 
1999-
2001 
183 127 756.5 718.1 3.20 3.50 2.32 2.61 0.80 0.81 0.01 0.00 
2-
2004 
187 150 629.4 681.3 5.86 6.04 4.98 5.14 6.40 6.48 5.59 5.66 
5-
2007 
141 129 982.5 1,019.5 0.64 0.66 -0.21 -0.19 0.82 0.82 0.09 0.09 
8-
2010 
179 142 1,218.7 1,262.3 7.13 7.00 6.33 6.20 5.25 5.20 4.57 4.52 
1-
2013 
173 127 1,352.7 1,453.5 5.33 5.47 4.61 4.72 5.48 5.71 4.92 5.14 
4-
2016 
137 96 1,539.1 1,196.7 4.48 4.38 3.82 3.66 4.40 4.96 4.01 4.51 
 
@Trading costs associated with investing in individual actively managed bond mutual funds are not included, owing to potential error, bias, 
and lack of reporting. Appendix A of Fama and French (2010) uses passively managed benchmarks with similar styles as those of actively 
managed equity funds to check estimate differences associated with trading costs, and finds such differences negligible. We assume the same 
for actively managed bond mutual funds. 
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Table 2: Bond Mutual Fund and the Five-Factor Model Return Summary Statistics and 
Correlation Matrix.  Panel A reports the number of observations (NOBS), mean, median, and 
standard deviation for monthly gross and net bond mutual fund returns for all funds, governments by 
reported duration, and corporates by reported average credit rating, over the sample period January 
1999 to December 2016. AAA denotes corporate mutual funds with average credit ratings of AAAs 
(AAA to AAA- if rated by S&P, or Aaa if rated By Moody’s), AA (AA+ to AA-, or Aa1 to Aa3), A 
(A+ to A-, or A1 to A3), B (BAA+ to BBB-, or Baa1 to Baa3), and LG (BB+ or lower, or Ba1 or 
lower). Panel B reports summary statistics for five-factor model returns. MKTRF is the value-weighted 
CRSP monthly return minus lagged one-month T-Bill rate. SMB is the difference in monthly return 
between stocks with market capitalization above and below the NYSE median. HML is the difference 
in monthly return between stocks with book-to-market equity ratios in the top and bottom 30% of 
the NYSE. TERM is the difference in monthly returns between long-term treasuries and lagged one-
month T-Bill rate. DEF is the difference in monthly return between corporate and long-term treasury 
bonds. RMO is the orthogonal linear projection of MKTRF on the other four factors. Panel C reports 
Pearson correlation coefficients for these variables. a and b denote statistical significance of Pearson 
correlation coefficients at the 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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  Monthly Gross Returns Monthly Net Returns 
 NOBS Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Bond Mutual Fund Returns 
All Funds 65,013 0.0031 0.0026 0.0152 0.0024 0.0020 0.0152 
Governments 41,602 0.0026 0.0019 0.0151 0.0020 0.0014 0.0151 
0 to 5 Years 19,401 0.0023 0.0019 0.0092 0.0017 0.0013 0.0092 
5 to 10 Years 8,328 0.0028 0.0031 0.0169 0.0023 0.0026 0.0169 
10 to 30 Years 2,539 0.0058 0.0051 0.0378 0.0054 0.0045 0.0378 
Missing 
Duration 
11,334 0.0022 0.0016 0.0128 0.0015 0.0010 0.0128 
Corporates 23,411 0.0039 0.0044 0.0152 0.0032 0.0037 0.0152 
AAA 183 0.0048 0.0045 0.0333 0.0040 0.0036 0.0333 
AA 1,745 0.0030 0.0036 0.0128 0.0024 0.0030 0.0128 
A 4,419 0.0037 0.0042 0.0148 0.0031 0.0036 0.0149 
BBB 6,194 0.0041 0.0046 0.0156 0.0034 0.0038 0.0156 
LG 2,592 0.0055 0.0061 0.0171 0.0047 0.0053 0.0171 
No Rating 8,278 0.0034 0.0042 0.0141 0.0027 0.0035 0.0141 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for 5-Factor Model Returns 
 
 
MKTRF 216 0.0043 0.0093 0.0444    
SMB 216 0.0037 0.0029 0.0349    
HML 216 0.0026 -0.0009 0.0330    
TERM 216 0.0042 0.0049 0.0316    
DEF 216 0.0002 0.0005 0.0191    
RMO 216 0.0038 0.0080 0.0380    
Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 MKRF SMB HML TERM DEF   
MKTRF 1 0.2581b -0.0867 -0.2718b 0.4798b   
SMB 0.2581b 1 -0.2946b -0.1285 0.1560a   
HML -0.0867 -0.2946b 1 -0.0358 0.0340   
TERM -0.2718b -0.1285 -0.0358 1 -0.4600b   
DEF 0.4798b 0.1560a 0.0340 -0.4600b 1   
RMO 0.8548b 0 0 0 0   
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Table 3: Intercepts and Slope Coefficients for Monthly Returns of Bond Mutual Funds on 5- and 10-Factor Models.  This table 
reports annualized intercepts with associated t-statistics in parentheses for EW and VW portfolio gross and net returns, using a Fama and 
French (1993) 5-factor model of bond fund returns, and 10-factor model, which includes select timing and non-linearity factors from Chen, 
Ferson, and Peters (2010). Only slope coefficients for net returns are reported; any differences in slope coefficients for gross returns are at 
the third significant digit. The sample period January 1999 through December 2016 contains 216 monthly observations. MKTRF is the value-
weighted CRSP monthly return minus lagged one-month T-Bill rate. RMO is the orthogonal linear projection of MKTRF on the other four 
factors. SMB is the difference in monthly return between stocks with market capitalization above and below the NYSE median. HML is the 
difference in monthly return between stocks with book-to-market equity ratios in the top and bottom 30% of the NYSE. TERM is the 
difference in monthly returns between long-term treasuries and one-month lag T-Bill rate. DEF is the difference in monthly return between 
corporate and long-term treasury bonds. Equity volatility, EQ VOLATILITY, is the one-month lag demeaned CBOE implied volatility index 
(VIX-OEX). PRC/DIV is an equity market valuation factor measured as the one-month lag demeaned price/dividend ratio for the CRSP 
value-weighted index. a and b denote statistical significance of the F-statistic at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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 All Funds Governments Corporates All Funds Governments Corporates 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
CONST*12: Gross 
Returns 
0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 (3.27) (2.50) (3.11) (2.32) (1.58) (1.23) (1.90) (1.25) (2.05) (1.58) (1.64) (0.85) 
CONST*12: Net Returns 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 (-1.41) (-1.26) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.58) (-1.23) (-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.35) (-0.59) (-0.07) (-0.27) 
RMOt 0.025 0.044 0.009 0.020 0.054 0.078 0.030 0.051 0.011 0.023 0.064 0.087 
 (-2.86) (-4.20) (-1.10) (-1.86) (-4.86) (-6.12) (-3.66) (-5.04) (-1.41) (-2.15) (-6.46) (-7.67) 
SMBt 0.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.003 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.010 -0.007 -0.003 0.017 0.028 
 (-0.41) (-0.813) (-0.56) (-0.20) (-1.41) (-1.69) (-0.24) (-0.85) (-0.79) (-0.28) (-1.51) (-2.15) 
HMLt -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.005 
 (-0.22) (-0.40) (-0.71) (-0.61) (-0.40) (-0.03) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.86) (-0.55) (-0.48) (-0.34) 
TERMt 0.33 0.349 0.302 0.318 0.365 0.399 0.366 0.398 0.332 0.352 0.422 0.463 
 (-27.54) (-24.36) (-27.70) (-21.69) (-24.28) (-23.22) (-28.99) (-25.65) (-26.93) (-21.07) (-27.82) (-26.45) 
DEFt 0.203 0.281 0.090 0.126 0.409 0.499 0.228 0.305 0.116 0.149 0.426 0.508 
 (-10.34) (-11.80) (-4.98) (-5.19) (-16.38) (-17.44) (-9.25) (-10.07) (-4.80) (-4.56) (-14.36) (-14.85) 
TERM t
2           0.167 0.285 0.061 0.106 0.338 0.515 
             (-0.94) (-1.30) (-0.35) (-0.45) (-1.57) (-2.08) 
DEFt
2           0.472 0.251 0.427 0.214 0.412 0.195 
             (-1.45) (-0.63) (-1.34) (-0.49) (-1.05) (-0.43) 
EQ VOLATILITYt-1 x TERM t  
  
        -0.235 -0.368 -0.155 -0.197 -0.383 -0.654 
             (-2.78) (-3.55) (-1.88) (-1.76) (-3.77) (-5.57) 
PRC/DIVt-1 x TERM t           0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
             (-4.094) (-3.08) (-2.99) (-2.58) (-4.68) (-2.54) 
PRC/DIV t-1 x DEFt           0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
             (-1.00) (-0.69) (-1.15) (-0.78) (-0.30) (-0.21) 
F-statistic 155.3b 122.9b 171.2b 101.6b 130.5b 128.4b 100.4b 78.3b 96.5b 56.3b 97.9b 94.3b 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.74 0.78 
 
 
 
 
0.74 0.75 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.82 0.72 0.82 0.81 
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Table 4: All Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Gross and Net Returns by Percentile.  This table reports 
estimated t(α) for simulated and actual bond mutual fund gross and net returns at each percentile (Pct) using a 5- and 10-factor model. At 
each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act is the percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower 
t(α) than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual t(α) worse (better) than simulated. Differences between actual and simulated t(α) may be random 
when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is better than simulated if Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a 
simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). Actual t(α) is worse than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% 
(i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely). p-value is a parametric test of statistical significance for t(α) based on a 
Student’s 𝑡-distribution with mean zero and 216 degrees of freedom. For p-values, superscript a (b) denote a statistically significant negative 
(positive) actual t(α).  
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All Bond Mutual Funds 
    5-Factor Gross Returns 10-Factor Gross Returns 5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns 
Pct Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
p 
value 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
p 
value 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
p 
value 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
p 
value 
1 -2.58 -1.84 ‡   85.1 0.034 a -2.53 -1.86 ‡ 86.0 0.032 a -2.58 -3.27 † 16.9 0.001 a -2.53 -2.91 23.5 0.002 a 
2 -2.22 -1.57 ‡   82.4 0.059 a -2.09 -1.49 ‡ 87.4 0.069 a -2.22 -2.44 33.6 0.008 a -2.09 -2.48 22.8 0.007 a 
3 -2.05 -1.27 ‡   87.9 0.103 -1.89 -1.38 ‡ 82.3 0.085 a -2.05 -2.03 45.6 0.022 a -1.89 -2.18 27.7 0.015 a 
4 -1.90 -0.96 ‡   93.5 0.169 -1.73 -1.29 78.8 0.099 a -1.90 -1.81 50.1 0.036 a -1.73 -1.99 29.7 0.024 a 
5 -1.79 -0.82 ‡   94.0 0.207 -1.62 -1.24 74.7 0.108 -1.79 -1.51 61.4 0.066 a -1.62 -1.84 31.4 0.034 a 
10 -1.42 -0.14 ‡   99.0 0.444 -1.22 -0.74 ‡ 81.1 0.230 -1.42 -0.82 ‡ 80.2 0.207 -1.22 -1.32 39.7 0.094 a 
20 -0.96 0.48 ‡   99.6 0.316 -0.76 -0.05 ‡ 92.1 0.480 -0.96 -0.12 ‡ 90.5 0.452 -0.76 -0.62 58.4 0.268 
30 -0.64 1.20 ‡ 100.0 0.116 -0.43 0.52 ‡ 97.1 0.302 -0.64 0.23 ‡ 91.2 0.409 -0.43 -0.26 60.4 0.398 
40 -0.36 1.73 ‡ 100.0 0.043 -0.15 1.18 ‡ 99.4 0.120 -0.36 0.61 ‡ 93.6 0.271 -0.14 0.17 71.6 0.433 
50 -0.10 2.21 ‡ 100.0 0.014 b 0.12 1.63 ‡ 99.7 0.052 b -0.10 1.06 ‡ 96.5 0.145 0.12 0.58 ‡ 79.5 0.281 
60 0.17 2.68 ‡ 100.0 0.004 b 0.38 1.97 ‡ 99.5 0.025 b 0.17 1.44 ‡ 97.6 0.076 b 0.38 0.88 ‡ 80.9 0.190 
70 0.45 3.18 ‡ 100.0 0.001 b 0.66 2.31 ‡ 99.5 0.011 b 0.45 1.88 ‡ 98.4 0.031 b 0.66 1.16 ‡ 80.4 0.124 
80 0.77 3.78 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 0.99 2.64 ‡ 99.3 0.004 b 0.77 2.33 ‡ 98.8 0.010 b 0.99 1.51 ‡ 80.7 0.066 b 
90 1.23 4.33 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 1.45 3.23 ‡ 99.3 0.001 b 1.23 3.00 ‡ 99.3 0.002 b 1.45 1.96 ‡ 79.5 0.026 b 
95 1.61 4.82 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 1.84 3.68 ‡ 99.1 0.000 b 1.61 3.40 ‡ 99.2 0.000 b 1.84 2.27 76.5 0.012 b 
96 1.73 4.93 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 1.94 3.91 ‡ 99.3 0.000 b 1.73 3.55 ‡ 99.2 0.000 b 1.95 2.40 76.8 0.009 b 
97 1.89 5.32 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 2.10 4.00 ‡ 99.1 0.000 b 1.89 3.63 ‡ 99.0 0.000 b 2.10 2.53 76.0 0.006 b 
98 2.07 5.62 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 2.29 4.18 ‡ 99.0 0.000 b 2.07 3.86 ‡ 99.2 0.000 b 2.30 2.88 ‡ 81.6 0.002 b 
99 2.49 6.59 ‡ 100.0 0.000 b 2.73 4.47 ‡ 98.0 0.000 b 2.49 4.45 ‡ 99.3 0.000 b 2.73 3.20 76.4 0.001 b 
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Table 5: All Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns at Different Annual Standard Deviations of 
Injected 𝜶.  The first three columns recap estimated t(α) for simulated and actual bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) from 
Table 3. Using different annual standard deviations for injected 𝛼, average simulated t(α) from 10,000 simulations and percent of 10,000 
simulations that generate lower t(α) than actual, are reported in Panels A and B using a 5- and 10-factor model. At different annual standard 
deviations of injected 𝛼, † (‡) denote critical values of standard deviation where average simulated t(α) will be worse (better) than actual. 
Differences between average simulated and actual t(α) may be random when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. Boxed columns indicate maximum standard 
deviation of injected alpha which make differences between simulated and actual t(α) attributable to random chance. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, 
simulated t(α) is worse than actual if Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as 
likely). Simulated t(α) is better than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is 
one-fourth as likely). Only top and bottom five percentiles are reported. 
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All Bond Mutual Funds 
Table 3  Standard Deviation of Injected Alpha  Standard Deviation of Injected Alpha 
Pct Sim Actual  0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75  0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 
Panel A: 5-Factor Net 
Returns 
Average Simulated 𝒕(𝜶)  % Simulated < Actual 
1 -2.58 -3.27 †  -2.69 -3.05 -3.89 -3.98 -4.98 -5.73 -6.39  20.4 34.9 73.9 79.6 98.5   99.9 100.0 
2 -2.22 -2.44  -2.34 -2.65 -3.29 † -3.43 -4.30 -4.99 -5.43  39.5 56.0 87.2 91.1 99.6 100.0 100.0 
3 -2.05 -2.03  -2.16 -2.45 -3.00 † -3.15 -3.96 -4.58 -4.89  52.1 68.0 92.1 95.0 99.8 100.0 100.0 
4 -1.90 -1.81  -2.01 -2.27 -2.76 † -2.91 -3.66 -4.20 -4.41  56.0 70.9 92.0 94.7 99.8 100.0 100.0 
5 -1.79 -1.51  -1.89 -2.13 -2.58 † -2.73 -3.43 -3.90 -4.08  67.1 79.6 95.3 97.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 
10 -1.42 -0.82 ‡  -1.50 -1.68 † -2.00 † -2.13 -2.68 -2.88 -3.07  84.3 90.5 97.7 98.6 99.9 100.0 100.0 
90 1.23 3.00 ‡  1.26 1.48 1.77 2.04 2.39 † 3.07 3.15  99.2 98.6 96.7 92.9 81.6 47.8 43.6 
95 1.61 3.40 ‡  1.66 1.93 2.34 2.76 3.11 4.00 4.10  99.0 98.0 93.4 82.4 67.1 22.1 17.7 
96 1.73 3.55 ‡  1.78 2.06 2.51 2.98 3.31 4.27 ‡ 4.38  99.0 98.0 92.2 79.3 64.5 17.8 13.7 
97 1.89 3.63 ‡  1.94 2.25 2.75 3.29 3.59 4.62 ‡ 4.74  98.8 97.2 88.1 69.8 54.7 9.8 6.5 
98 2.07 3.86 ‡  2.12 2.45 3.01 3.62 3.89 5.01 ‡ 5.16   98.9 97.2 86.5 64.8 50.6 6.6 4.0 
99 2.49 4.45 ‡  2.52 2.87 3.52 4.21 4.53 5.77 ‡ 5.97  99.4 97.9 86.6 64.2 47.6 4.1 2.6 
Panel B: 10-Factor Net 
Returns 
Average Simulated 𝒕(𝜶)  % Simulated < Actual 
1 -2.53 -2.91 †  -2.53 -2.81 -3.50 † -3.59 -4.42 -5.14 -5.74  23.7 40.1 80.2 86.0 98.7 100.0 100.0 
2 -2.09 -2.48 †  -2.17 -2.41 -2.98 -3.07 -3.81 -4.45 -4.85  27.2 41.8 78.9 83.9 98.1   99.9 100.0 
3 -1.89 -2.18 †  -1.97 -2.19 -2.68 † -2.77 -3.46  -4.03 -4.31  32.0 46.3 79.7 84.4 98.1   99.9 100.0 
4 -1.73 -1.99 †  -1.81 -2.02 -2.46 -2.55 -3.19 -3.69 -3.92  34.2 47.7 79.0 83.2 97.7   99.8 100.0 
5 -1.62 -1.84 †  -1.70 -1.89 -2.29 -2.38 -2.99 -3.41 -3.61  36.1 48.8 78.0 82.4 97.4   99.7   99.9 
10 -1.22 -1.32  -1.29 -1.44 -1.73 -1.81 -2.28 -2.48 -2.66  44.8 55.9 76.9 80.9 95.8   98.7   99.3 
90 1.45 1.96 ‡  1.48 1.66 1.93 2.14 2.48 3.11 3.22  78.2 70.3 54.8 40.4 22.1  2.2  2.1 
95 1.84 2.27 ‡  1.87 2.12 2.51 2.86 ‡ 3.19 4.04 4.14  74.6 62.8 39.3 20.9 10.1  0.3  0.1 
96 1.95 2.40 ‡  1.99 2.25 2.68 3.08 ‡ 3.39 4.30 4.40  75.0 62.1 36.9 17.7  8.6  0.1  0.1 
97 2.10 2.53 ‡  2.14 2.42 2.90 3.37 ‡ 3.63  4.62 4.73  74.2 60.6 33.0 13.4  6.4  0.0  0.0 
98 2.30 2.88 ‡  2.34 2.65 3.19 3.74 ‡ 3.96 5.03 5.16  79.8 66.6 37.3 14.7  7.3  0.0  0.0 
99 2.73 3.20 ‡  2.70 3.04 3.67 4.31 ‡ 4.53 5.72 5.88  77.6 62.3 30.1   9.1  3.2  0.0  0.0 
 94 
 
Table 6: All Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns for 
Government and Corporate Bond Funds.  This table reports t(α) for simulated and actual bond 
mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) stratified by average fund AUM using a 5- and 10-
factor model. At each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act 
is the percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual 
t(α) worse (better) than simulated. Differences between actual and simulated t(α) may be random 
when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is better than simulated if Sim<Act 
and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). 
Actual t(α) is worse than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) 
lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely).  
 
 5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns 
 Government Corporate Government Corporate 
Pct Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
Sim Actual %Sim
<Act 
1 -2.52 -3.75 † 5.5 -2.45 -2.30 51.8 -2.57 -3.08 † 19.6 -2.35 -2.43 40.9 
2 -2.21 -3.08 † 10.5 -2.20 -1.88 61.5 -2.15 -2.68 † 17.4 -2.04 -2.20 36.2 
3 -1.97 -2.44 22.5 -2.04 -1.60 67.8 -1.88 -2.37 † 18.6 -1.85 -1.85 46.3 
4 -1.85 -2.03 35.5 -1.91 -1.42  70.0 -1.74 -2.18 21.2 -1.72 -1.66 50.8 
5 -1.73 -1.79 41.9 -1.78 -1.33  68.9 -1.63 -2.01 23.6 -1.56 -1.55 47.0 
10 -1.36 -0.82 78.9 -1.44 -0.85 76.0 -1.23 -1.31 40.6 -1.19 -1.32 38.0 
20 -0.92 -0.18 ‡ 88.1 -1.00 -0.04 ‡ 91.9 -0.76 -0.61 58.4 -0.73 -0.57 59.2 
30 -0.61 0.16 ‡ 88.5 -0.67 0.34 ‡ 93.3 -0.44 -0.15 68.4 -0.40 -0.33 53.2 
40 -0.34 0.52 ‡ 91.2 -0.39 0.83 ‡ 96.3 -0.16 0.34 ‡ 81.0 -0.11 0.05 59.9 
50 -0.09 0.92 ‡ 94.2 -0.11 1.16 ‡ 96.6 0.09 0.66 ‡ 84.0 0.17 0.39 63.9 
60 0.16 1.35 ‡ 96.8 0.16 1.56 ‡ 97.4 0.34 1.02 ‡ 87.6 0.44 0.65 63.4 
70 0.43 1.80 ‡ 98.1 0.46 1.96 ‡ 97.9 0.61 1.23 ‡ 85.3 0.73 1.04 69.5 
80 0.75 2.20 ‡ 98.3 0.79 2.56 ‡ 98.9 0.92 1.63 ‡ 87.3 1.06 1.31 66.4 
90 1.20 2.88 ‡ 99.0 1.23 3.10 ‡ 99.0 1.37 2.02 ‡ 84.5 1.51 1.75 66.3 
95 1.57 3.40 ‡ 99.2 1.60 3.44 ‡ 98.8 1.75 2.32 ‡ 82.5 1.88 2.21 70.4 
96 1.70 3.55 ‡ 99.3 1.73 3.54 ‡ 98.7 1.85 2.40 ‡ 81.6 2.03 2.23 64.1 
97 1.83 3.59 ‡ 99.1 1.87 3.82 ‡ 99.1 1.98 2.51 ‡ 81.1 2.17 2.55 71.7 
98 2.08 3.86 ‡ 99.1 2.05 4.12 ‡ 99.3 2.23 2.76 ‡ 80.8 2.35 2.95 78.8 
99 2.50 4.44 ‡ 98.6 2.33 4.84 ‡ 99.8 2.66 3.02 73.6 2.66 3.20 76.0 
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Table 7: All Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns by AUM.  This table reports t(α) for simulated 
and actual bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) stratified by average fund AUM using a 5- and 10-factor model. At each 
percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act is the percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) 
than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual t(α) worse (better) than simulated. Differences between actual and simulated t(α) may be random 
when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is better than simulated if Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a 
simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). Actual t(α) is worse than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% 
(i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely).  
 
All Bond Mutual Funds 
 5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns 
 $5-250 Million AUM $250-750 Million AUM >$750 Million AUM $5-250 Million AUM $250-750 Million AUM >$750 Million AUM 
Pct Sim Actual 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
1 -2.93 -3.14 35.2 -3.53 -2.66 
‡ 
80.1 -3.66 -3.62 38.9 -3.31 -2.91 56.6 -4.62 -3.04 
‡ 
82.1 -3.82 -2.44 
‡ 
82.6 
2 -2.41 -2.66 31.6 -2.66 -2.41 61.7 -2.63 -2.07 72.9 -2.41 -2.68 29.0 -3.21 -2.20 
‡ 
87.7 -3.24 -1.97 
‡ 
89.6 
3 -2.16 -2.01 53.9 -2.33 -2.28 49.0 -2.38 -1.92 71.4 -2.09 -2.43 24.4 -2.67 -2.01 
‡ 
84.2 -2.46 -1.82 
‡ 
80.6 
4 -1.99 -1.69 64.1 -2.13 -2.11 47.0 -2.09 -1.49 ‡ 82.2 -1.92 -2.20 27.7 -2.27 -1.83 78.3 -2.23 -1.64 
‡ 
82.3 
5 -1.87 -1.60 61.5 -2.00 -1.99 45.9 -1.99 -1.15 ‡ 92.5 -1.77 -1.99 31.3 -2.08 -1.81   68.8 -1.96 -1.64 69.8 
10 -1.45 -0.92 79.1 -1.54 -1.16  74.8 -1.50 -0.99 ‡ 80.2 -1.32 -1.43 38.1 -1.50 -1.48 48.9 -1.43 -1.26  60.9 
20 -0.98 -0.35 ‡ 85.6 -1.02 -0.60 79.4 -0.99 -0.35 ‡ 88.0 -0.83 -0.76 53.0 -0.93 -0.86 54.3 -0.89 -0.53 76.7 
30 -0.64 0.06 ‡ 89.1 -0.65 0.00 ‡ 92.1 -0.64 0.10 ‡ 92.3 -0.48 -0.38 55.6 -0.54 -0.44 59.1 -0.52 -0.06 
‡ 
83.0 
40 -0.35 0.44 ‡ 92.3 -0.35 0.41 ‡ 95.5 -0.34 0.45 ‡ 93.8 -0.18 0.01 64.6 -0.23 -0.06 64.8 -0.21 0.42 ‡ 90.7 
50 -0.08 0.76 ‡ 93.3 -0.07 0.76 ‡ 96.8 -0.06 0.78 ‡ 94.5 0.09 0.36 70.7 0.07 0.41 78.6 0.07 0.64 ‡ 87.6 
60 0.18 1.10 ‡ 94.6 0.21 1.08 ‡ 97.0 0.22 1.37 ‡ 98.5 0.36 0.67 72.8 0.37 0.73 79.5 0.35 1.02 ‡ 90.2 
70 0.47 1.48 ‡ 96.2 0.52 1.46 ‡ 97.4 0.51 1.79 ‡ 98.8 0.65 1.03 77.3 0.69 1.08 ‡ 79.9 0.66 1.46 ‡ 92.8 
80 0.81 2.04 ‡ 97.9 0.88 1.92 ‡ 97.9 0.86 2.46 ‡ 99.4 1.00 1.35 74.9 1.08 1.44 77.0 1.03 1.89 ‡ 93.1 
90 1.29 2.76 ‡ 98.9 1.40 2.56 ‡ 98.0 1.38 2.97 ‡ 99.1 1.50 2.02 ‡ 82.1 1.66 1.96 72.7 1.57 2.62 ‡ 95.1 
95 1.71 3.19 ‡ 98.7 1.87 3.16 ‡ 98.2 1.88 3.12 ‡ 96.8 1.96 2.40 78.5 2.26 2.42 63.7 2.08 3.01 ‡ 91.1 
96 1.85 3.29 ‡ 98.6 2.01 3.27 ‡ 98.0 1.99 3.20 ‡ 96.3 2.11 2.50 76.4 2.45 2.44 52.9 2.34 3.66 ‡ 94.8 
97 2.02 3.49 ‡ 98.6 2.22 3.45 ‡ 97.3 2.28 3.59 ‡ 95.7 2.28 2.76 79.4 2.86 2.56 39.1 2.56 3.87 ‡ 93.1 
98 2.30 3.70 ‡ 98.4 2.57 3.60 ‡ 93.7 2.53 3.59 ‡ 90.7 2.61 3.02 75.4 3.41 2.88 36.2 3.29 3.92 77.5 
99 2.94 4.45 ‡ 95.6 3.52 4.54 ‡ 85.6 3.56 4.27 77.4 3.61 3.22 44.1 4.80 4.38 50.2 3.79 7.30 ‡ 95.6 
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Table 8: Government and Corporate Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns by AUM.  This table 
reports t(α) estimates for simulated and actual government bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) stratified by fund average 
AUM using a 5- and 10-factor model. At each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act is the percent 
of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) than actual. Superscript † and ‡ denote actual returns that are worse and better than simulated 
returns, respectively. Differences between actual and simulated t(α) may be random when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual 
t(α) is better than simulated if Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). 
Actual t(α) is worse than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as 
likely).  
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 5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns 
 $5-250 Million AUM $250-750 Million AUM >$750 Million AUM $5-250 Million AUM $250-750 Million AUM >$750 Million AUM 
Pct Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Government Bond Mutual Funds               
1 -2.79 -3.75 
† 
10.3 -3.60 -2.66 
‡ 
75.6 -4.09 -3.62 48.2 -3.50 -3.08 52.3 -4.30 -3.04 75.2 -3.90 -7.84 
† 
5.3 
2 -2.33 -2.98 
† 
15.5 -2.65 -2.37 60.9 -3.14 -2.44 64.2 -2.50 -2.75  29.8 -3.12 -2.20 
‡ 
82.6 -3.23 -2.44 66.7 
3 -2.10 -2.54 22.2 -2.29 -2.28 46.8 -2.54 -1.92 74.0 -2.13 -2.48 24.6 -2.72 -2.01 
‡ 
81.6 -2.66 -1.82 
‡ 
80.9 
4 -1.94 -2.01 41.1 -2.10 -2.26 35.4 -2.22 -1.49 
‡ 
85.7 -1.92 -2.37 
† 
19.2 -2.26 -1.82 76.1 -2.28 -1.66 78.2 
5 -1.81 -1.66 55.4 -1.99 -1.99 46.5 -2.01 -1.15 
‡ 
92.5 -1.76 -2.18 20.7 -2.03 -1.81  63.5 -2.00 -1.58 72.0 
10 -1.41 -0.81 
‡ 
83.7 -1.52 -1.19 71.2 -1.48 -1.01 
‡ 
79.1 -1.32 -1.31 46.5 -1.47 -1.56 40.2 -1.45 -1.41 49.9 
90 1.25 2.56 ‡ 98.0 1.34 2.58 ‡ 98.2 1.35 2.95 ‡ 99.2 1.44 2.06 ‡ 86.0 1.61 1.93 73.6 1.57 2.65 ‡ 95.3 
95 1.66 3.06 ‡ 98.4 1.81 2.99 ‡ 97.3 1.89 3.03 ‡ 95.0 1.88 2.37 ‡ 81.2 2.19 2.29 59.6 2.14 2.97 ‡ 87.9 
96 1.79 3.16 ‡ 98.2 1.92 3.22 ‡ 98.0 2.11 3.20 ‡ 92.9 2.03 2.44 77.4 2.45 2.30 46.1 2.41 3.01 ‡ 80.1 
97 1.96 3.23 ‡ 97.6 2.13 3.41 ‡ 97.0 2.47 3.59 ‡ 90.0 2.24 2.50 69.8 2.94 2.41 30.9 2.82 3.87 ‡ 86.4 
98 2.22 3.29 ‡ 95.4 2.53 3.60 ‡ 92.1 3.13 3.59  73.7 2.63 2.76 62.4 3.37 2.50 † 23.5 3.30 3.96 76.9 
99 2.81 3.55 ‡ 84.1 3.60 4.33 77.7 4.17 4.27 62.3 3.75 3.17 41.8 4.60 2.62 † 8.9 3.86 7.30 ‡ 93.4 
Corporate Bond Mutual Funds               
1 -2.99 -2.73 53.6 -3.00 -2.42 68.8 -3.38 -2.07 
‡ 
80.7 -3.42 -2.73 63.9 -4.34 -3.01 70.8 -3.29 -2.25 73.7 
2 -2.42 -1.95 69.0 -2.54 -2.41 51.5 -2.44 -1.57 
‡ 
82.4 -2.49 -2.43 47.0 -3.60 -2.15 
‡ 
85.9 -2.51 -1.97 65.1 
3 -2.17 -1.69 71.4 -2.28 -2.11 55.7 -2.44 -1.57 
‡ 
82.4 -2.11 -2.20 40.8 -2.98 -1.94 
‡ 
83.2 -2.51 -1.97 65.1 
4 -2.01 -1.60 67.1 -2.11 -2.08 47.6 -2.05 -1.34 
‡ 
81.8 -1.90 -1.96 42.6 -2.52 -1.83 78.1 -2.05 -1.64 67.3 
5 -1.88 -1.49 66.4 -1.98 -1.87 53.0 -1.88 -1.13 
‡ 
84.1 -1.74 -1.78 44.3 -2.22 -1.67 77.3 -2.05 -1.64 67.3 
10 -1.47 -1.09 67.1 -1.55 -0.85 
‡ 
89.7 -1.46 -0.79 
‡ 
83.3 -1.31 -1.45 37.3 -1.54 -1.28 67.1 -1.43 -0.88 
‡ 
81.6 
90 1.30 2.99 ‡ 99.1 1.48 2.51 ‡ 95.3 1.36 3.08 ‡ 98.7 1.57 1.84 68.8 1.73 2.22 78.9 1.59 2.52 ‡ 89.8 
95 1.72 3.57 ‡ 99.3 1.93 3.16 ‡ 96.7 1.79 3.12 ‡ 95.4 2.00 2.50 78.3 2.39 2.64 66.8 2.14 3.52 ‡ 94.0 
96 1.86 3.70 ‡ 99.3 2.07 3.27 ‡ 96.1 1.96 3.22 ‡ 93.7 2.16 2.82 ‡ 83.3 2.68 2.88 65.5 2.14 3.66 ‡ 95.1 
97 2.03 4.12 ‡ 99.6 2.25 3.45 ‡ 95.4 2.31 3.43 ‡ 89.4 2.38 2.97 ‡ 80.4 3.09 3.40 69.5 2.55 3.87 ‡ 90.4 
98 2.31 5.17 ‡ 99.8 2.51 3.54 ‡ 91.5 2.31 3.43 ‡ 89.4 2.77 3.09 69.5 3.67 4.38 76.4 2.55 3.87 ‡ 90.4 
99 2.99 5.74 ‡ 97.0 2.99 4.84 ‡ 95.0 3.09 3.60  71.9 3.70 3.22 44.6 4.34 4.77 68.4 3.23 3.92 76.6 
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Table 9: Bond Mutual Fund 3-Year t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns.  This table reports 3-year t(α) for simulated 
and actual government bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) for all funds and stratified by average fund AUM, for 
governments, and for corporates, using a 5- and 10-factor model. At each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, 
and %Sim<Act is the percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual t(α) worse (better) than 
simulated. Differences between actual and simulated t(α) may be random when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is 
better than simulated if Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). Actual 
t(α) is worse than simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely). 
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3-Year 𝒕(𝜶) by Bond Mutual Fund Categories 
 All Bond Funds $5-250 Million AUM $250-750 Million AUM >$750 Million AUM Governments Corporates 
Pct Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Panel A: 5-Factor Net 
Returns 
               
1 -3.42 -2.93 66.03 -3.85 -3.18 70.89 -4.91 -3.13 ‡ 92.18 -3.88 -2.79 ‡ 83.49 -3.49 -2.87 69.99 -3.32 -3.17 46.96 
2 -2.81 -2.52 58.95 -2.98 -2.77 55.11 -3.40 -2.67 ‡ 80.86 -3.01 -2.10 ‡ 89.09 -2.84 -2.54 58.47 -2.69 -2.26 67.72 
3 -2.52 -2.10 68.13 -2.63 -2.44 54.16 -2.85 -2.40 72.34 -2.63 -1.83 ‡ 89.07 -2.55 -2.24 60.29 -2.39 -2.02 66.50 
4 -2.32 -1.89 70.86 -2.40 -2.24 53.49 -2.55 -2.22 66.91 -2.40 -1.71 ‡ 86.13 -2.35 -1.89 70.00 -2.20 -1.88 65.18 
5 -2.16 -1.76 70.65 -2.23 -2.04 56.09 -2.34 -2.13 59.75 -2.22 -1.58 ‡ 85.74 -2.20 -1.77 69.47 -2.06 -1.75 65.62 
10 -1.66 -1.38 66.84 -1.69 -1.47 63.23 -1.71 -1.52 63.08 -1.65 -1.21 ‡ 80.84 -1.70 -1.34 70.28 -1.58 -1.45 56.22 
90  1.49  2.46 ‡ 95.52  1.52  2.28 ‡ 92.85  1.60  2.44 ‡ 94.71  1.54  2.63 ‡ 96.31  1.48  2.51 ‡ 95.41  1.50  2.42 ‡ 93.82 
95  1.98  2.95 ‡ 92.97  2.05  2.81 ‡ 89.75  2.23  2.99 ‡ 90.10  2.09  3.05 ‡ 92.35  1.96  2.94 ‡ 91.81  1.97  2.95 ‡ 92.51 
96  2.13  3.09 ‡ 92.22  2.22  2.95 ‡ 88.34  2.45  3.11 ‡ 86.87  2.26  3.10 ‡ 89.09  2.11  3.07 ‡ 91.10  2.12  3.10 ‡ 91.84 
97  2.33  3.29 ‡ 91.50  2.46  3.20 ‡ 87.97  2.78  3.29 ‡ 80.63  2.50  3.27 ‡ 86.45  2.30  3.29 ‡ 91.17  2.31  3.29 ‡ 91.34 
98  2.63  3.63 ‡ 91.31  2.84  3.55 ‡ 85.65  3.37  3.59 66.31  2.88  3.43 ‡ 78.12  2.59  3.63 ‡ 91.12  2.63  3.58 ‡ 89.48 
99  3.31  4.16 ‡ 85.20  3.88  4.16 68.07  4.96  3.91 27.10  3.84  3.77 56.76  3.36  3.96 ‡ 78.50  3.32  4.24 ‡ 84.75 
Panel B: 10-Factor Net 
Returns 
               
1 -4.72 -3.51 76.41 -5.82 -3.51 ‡ 93.80 -6.91 -4.14 ‡ 95.65 -5.75 -2.57 ‡ 98.46 -4.71 -2.98 ‡ 89.49 -4.64 -4.10 53.52 
2 -3.63 -2.62 78.73 -4.20 -2.87 ‡ 85.38 -5.74 -2.89 ‡ 98.16 -4.41 -2.11 ‡ 98.11 -3.61 -2.41 ‡ 86.02 -3.61 -2.93 62.43 
3 -3.17 -2.32 75.83 -3.49 -2.54 78.72 -4.59 -2.41 ‡ 97.71 -3.64 -1.87 ‡ 97.26 -3.15 -2.24 78.63 -3.13 -2.62 58.53 
4 -2.90 -2.16 72.59 -3.11 -2.32 74.58 -3.79 -2.29 ‡ 93.66 -3.18 -1.81 ‡ 94.27 -2.89 -2.07 76.23 -2.83 -2.37 58.46 
5 -2.68 -2.03 70.42 -2.85 -2.16 72.27 -3.30 -2.17 ‡ 89.15 -2.87 -1.78 ‡ 89.49 -2.69 -1.99 71.80 -2.60 -2.17 59.60 
10 -1.95 -1.63 63.42 -2.06 -1.73 61.71 -2.17 -1.70 74.07 -2.01 -1.47 77.21 -2.00 -1.61 65.09 -1.88 -1.64 58.52 
90  1.89  2.02 63.65  1.94  1.97 59.09  2.17  2.04 47.42  1.99  2.29 71.89  1.85  2.02 66.10  1.95  1.98 56.58 
95  2.56  2.38 48.26  2.70  2.36 39.82  3.29  2.52 23.43  2.80  2.78 56.97  2.49  2.35 52.14  2.67  2.45 47.89 
96  2.80  2.52 45.40  2.98  2.55 37.15  3.81  2.60 † 13.54  3.13  2.86 46.87  2.69  2.50 50.08  2.92  2.56 44.00 
97  3.12  2.70 40.72  3.40  2.75 29.99  4.63  2.76 †   6.87  3.59  3.19 44.82  2.99  2.69 46.13  3.24  2.73 39.23 
98  3.63  2.92 30.99  4.18  3.04 † 19.06  5.71  3.14 †   4.13  4.37  3.62 37.81  3.51  2.86 33.44  3.75  2.95 30.99 
99  4.80  3.59 23.50  5.84  3.60 † 7.47  6.82  4.28 †   7.69  5.62  4.05 22.80  4.68  3.72 31.04  4.86  3.37 † 18.80 
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Table 10: Cumulative Economic Value Across All Bond Mutual Funds.  At each percentile (Pct) sorted by 𝑡(𝛼). Sim 𝑡(𝛼) is the average 
value of annualized alpha in 10,000 simulations using a 5-factor and 10-factor model on net returns. Cumulative assets under management 
(AUM) is the aggregate amount at each percentile. At each percentile, EV is computed as the triple product of the annualized standard error 
of 𝛼, differences between actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼), and incremental AUM at each percentile. Cumulative EV aggregates EV from 99th to 
1st percentile and expressed as a percentage of cumulative AUM in basis points. 
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  5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns  5-Factor Net Returns 10-Factor Net Returns 
Pct 
Total 
Number 
of Funds 
Cumulative  
AUM 
($Mil) 
Std 
Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
Cumulative  
AUM 
($Mil) 
Std 
Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
Total 
Number 
of Funds 
Cumulative 
AUM 
($Mil) 
Std  
Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
Cumulative 
AUM 
($Mil) 
Std 
Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
 All Bond Funds >$750M Bond Funds 
1 6 2,354 0.16 30.0 2,878 0.70 6.0 2 2,287 0.26 29.1 2,395 1.43 41.9 
2 12 4,561 0.21 30.2 3,270 0.25 6.2 4 5,340 0.59 29.2 6,945 0.40 40.9 
3 17 7,408 0.47 30.4 3,644 0.36 6.3 5 6,321 0.21 29.2 8,687 0.37 40.8 
4 23 10,373 0.62 30.6 4,806 0.25 6.3 7 8,068 0.76 29.3 17,748 0.18 40.9 
5 29 10,993 0.17 30.8 10,505 0.59 6.3 9 11,485 0.44 29.2 21,787 0.25 41.6 
10 57 18,150 0.27 30.8 45,447 0.24 6.6 17 21,667 0.22 29.1 46,861 0.19 42.0 
90 508 367,486 0.17 26.3 372,196 0.09 6.5 147 333,459 0.17 21.7 346,951 0.21 24.7 
95 536 399,320 0.12 22.9 402,700 0.11 7.6 155 360,608 0.17 17.0 359,682 0.37 28.0 
96 542 403,599 0.09 24.5 404,903 0.14 13.4 157 365,251 0.10 11.2 360,595 0.28 18.9 
97 548 414,929 0.09 26.7 407,159 0.10 14.7 159 370,781 0.10 10.8 362,686 0.37 16.9 
98 553 416,270 0.28 51.2 416,169 0.27 17.0 160 373,186 0.01 9.5 364,996 0.19 5.9 
99 559 419,902 0.26 51.8 417,100 0.62 28.8 162 377,891 0.20 13.9 368,783 0.01 2.0 
 Government Bond Funds Corporate Bond Funds 
1 4 1,468 0.18 20.2 2,373 0.13 25.7 3 1,051 0.31 34.8 626 0.17 2.9 
2 7 2,426 0.97 20.5 2,460 0.23 26.0 5 2,584 0.18 35.0 4,602 0.21 3.0 
3 11 2,757 0.21 20.9 2,814 0.20 26.1 7 3,216 0.29 35.2 4,653 0.85 3.1 
4 14 5,712 0.47 20.9 3,035 0.29 26.1 10 4,148 0.24 35.3 5,222 0.25 3.1 
5 18 7,321 0.80 21.4 3,781 0.37 26.1 12 4,464 0.38 35.4 13,417 0.99 3.1 
10 35 10,825 0.27 21.7 16,866 0.23 26.3 23 6,158 0.17 35.5 29,237 0.24 3.7 
90 311 214,113 0.11 20.7 213,071 0.12   9.1 204 165,980 0.18 43.9 172,954 0.21 7.3 
95 328 224,626 0.12 24.4 226,561 0.12 10.5 215 180,570 0.31 58.4 179,257 0.30 10.2 
96 332 228,493 0.09 25.8 228,293 0.14 14.4 217 180,982 0.68 60.7 182,486 0.31 10.7 
97 335 233,522 0.10 28.6 229,040 0.16 15.5 220 183,671 0.26 53.1 182,732 0.31 23.8 
98 339 238,213 0.28 35.9 238,971 0.31 16.0 222 183,973 0.35 63.4 183,131 0.35 27.4 
99 342 241,673 0.09 17.4 239,414 0.33 11.9 224 184,339 0.22 55.7 183,563 0.62 33.5 
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Figure 1: Simulated vs. actual cumulative and probability density functions of 𝒕(𝜶) using a 5-factor and 10-factor model of gross 
returns for all bond mutual funds. Solid blue lines are estimated 𝑡(𝛼) from regressions of actual returns over the entire sample period. 
Dotted red lines are estimated average 𝑡(𝛼) from 10,000 bootstrapped simulations. Numbers from left to right below probability density 
functions indicate means and annualized standard deviations for actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼). 
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Figure 2: Simulated vs. actual cumulative and probability density functions of 𝒕(𝜶) using a 5-factor and 10-factor model of net 
returns for all bond mutual funds. Solid blue lines are estimated 𝑡(𝛼) from regressions of actual returns over the entire sample period. 
Dotted red lines are estimated average 𝑡(𝛼) from 10,000 bootstrapped simulations. Numbers from left to right below probability density 
functions indicate means and annualized standard deviations for actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼).
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1: Intercepts and Slope Coefficients for Monthly Gross Returns of Bond Mutual Funds on 5- and 10-Factor Models.  
This table reports intercept and slope coefficients with associated t-statistics in parentheses for EW and VW portfolio gross returns, using a 
Fama and French (1993) 5-factor model of bond fund returns, and 10-factor model, which includes select timing and non-linearity factors 
from Chen, Ferson, and Peters (2010). Constants are annualized by multiplying by 12. The sample period January 1999 through December 
2016 contains 216 monthly observations. MKTRF is the value-weighted CRSP monthly return minus lagged one-month T-Bill rate. SMB is 
the difference in monthly return between stocks with market capitalization above and below the NYSE median. HML is the difference in 
monthly return between stocks with book-to-market equity ratios in the top and bottom 30% of the NYSE. TERM is the difference in 
monthly returns between long-term treasuries and lagged one-month T-Bill rate. DEF is the difference in monthly return between corporate 
and long-term treasury bonds. RMO is the orthogonal linear projection of MKTRF on the other four factors. Equity volatility, EQ 
VOLATILITY, is the CBOE implied volatility index (VIX-OEX). PRC/DIV is an equity market valuation factor measured as the 
price/dividend ratio for the CRSP value-weighted index. a and b denote statistical significance of the F-statistic at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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 All Funds Governments Corporates All Funds Governments Corporates 
 EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
CONSTANT*12 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.005 
 (3.265) (2.497) (3.110) (2.319) (1.580) (1.234) (1.903) (1.248) (2.051) (1.580) (1.638) (0.852) 
RMOt 0.025 0.044 0.009 0.020 0.054 0.078 0.030 0.050 0.011 0.023 0.064 0.087 
 (2.843) (4.158) (1.073) (1.816) (4.861) (6.121) (3.639) (4.990) (1.377) (2.113) (6.446) (7.637) 
SMBt 0.004 0.010 -0.005 -0.002 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.010 -0.007 -0.003 0.017 0.028 
 (0.434) (0.851) (-0.535) (-0.162) (1.408) (1.693) (0.267) (0.891) (-0.761) (-0.238) (1.524) (2.173) 
HMLt -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 0.005 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.005 
 (-0.215) (-0.374) (-0.703) (-0.566) (0.396) (-0.025) (-0.299) (-0.204) (-0.839) (-0.506) (0.485) (0.357) 
TERMt 0.325 0.349 0.302 0.318 0.365 0.399 0.366 0.398 0.331 0.352 0.422 0.463 
 (27.529) (24.327) (27.687) (21.660) (24.281) (23.218) (28.965) (25.611) (26.898) (21.048) (27.819) (26.445) 
DEFt 0.203 0.281 0.090 0.126 0.409 0.498 0.228 0.305 0.115 0.149 0.426 0.508 
 (10.328) (11.768) (4.966) (5.168) (16.375) (17.444) (9.232) (10.042) (4.780) (4.544) (14.349) (14.839) 
TERM t
2           0.165 0.282 0.059 0.104 0.337 0.513 
             (0.925) (1.285) (0.336) (0.439) (1.567) (2.070) 
DEFt
2           0.461 0.236 0.414 0.192 0.404 0.190 
             (1.413) (0.589) (1.302) (0.444) (1.031) (0.420) 
EQ 
VOLATILITYt-1 
          -0.235 -0.368 -0.155 -0.196 -0.383 -0.652 
             (-2.777) (-3.538) (-1.878) (-1.751) (-3.767) (-5.566) 
PRC/DIVt-1 x TERM t 
  
        0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 
             (4.082) (3.083) (2.979) (2.591) (4.674) (2.547) 
PRC/DIV t-1 x 
DEFt 
          0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
             (0.998) (0.697) (1.140) (0.791) (0.298) (-0.204) 
F-statistic 155.31b 122.85b 171.15b 101.64b 130.47b 128.39b 100.42b 78.34b 96.53b 56.31b 97.91b 94.32b 
Adjusted R2 0.782 0.739 0.782 0.739 0.751 0.748 0.824 0.784 0.818 0.722 0.820 0.814 
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Appendix Table 2: Government Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns by Duration.  Panels A 
and B in this table report t(α) for simulated and actual government bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) stratified by average 
fund duration using a 5- and 10-factor model. At each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act is the 
percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual t(α) worse (better) than simulated. Differences 
between actual and simulated t(α) may be random when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is better than simulated if 
Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). Actual t(α) is worse than 
simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely).  
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Government Bond Mutual Funds 
 0 to 5 Years 5 to 10 Years 10 to 30 Years Missing Effective Duration 
Pct Sim Actual %Sim<A
ct 
Sim Actual %Sim<A
ct 
Sim Actual %Sim<A
ct 
Sim Actual %Sim<A
ct Panel A: 5-Factor Net Returns           
1 -4.89 -3.21 ‡ 97.0 -4.99 -2.42 ‡ 99.9 -2.98 -2.47 69.2 -4.66 -4.76 38.6 
2 -4.11 -2.97 ‡ 93.3 -4.23 -1.90 ‡ 100.0 -2.98 -2.47 69.2 -3.58 -2.87 ‡ 81.3 
3 -3.56 -2.61 ‡ 93.5 -3.74 -1.72 ‡ 100.0 -2.98 -2.47 69.2 -3.06 -2.43 ‡ 85.0 
4 -3.15 -2.20 ‡ 96.5 -3.20 -1.61 ‡ 99.8 -2.30 -2.37 43.3 -2.79 -2.20 ‡ 87.5 
5 -2.92 -2.04 ‡ 95.5 -2.99 -1.59 ‡ 99.7 -2.24 -2.37 39.5 -2.58 -2.02 ‡ 86.2 
10 -2.08 -0.94 ‡ 99.1 -2.19 -1.37 ‡ 94.7 -1.83 -2.24 † 23.6 -1.84 -0.89 ‡ 99.2 
90 1.67 3.18 ‡ 99.5 1.97 1.78 36.9 1.56 1.13 27.4 2.02 2.56 ‡ 87.2 
95 2.27 3.63 ‡ 99.1 2.80 2.68 42.2 2.23 1.92 40.2 2.74 3.14 78.4 
96 2.43 3.66 ‡ 98.5 3.01 2.76 32.9 2.34 1.92 35.6 2.95 3.19 68.0 
97 2.71 3.88 ‡ 97.5 3.49 2.83 † 15.0 3.54 4.12 73.0 3.22 3.39 65.2 
98 3.11 4.00 ‡ 92.2 3.90 3.45 30.5 3.54 4.12 73.0 3.74 3.48 40.4 
99 3.73 4.48 ‡ 84.5 4.50 3.54 † 16.1 3.54 4.12 73.0 4.72 4.21 32.8 
Panel B: 10-Factor Net 
Returns 
          
1 -4.42 -3.33 ‡ 88.5 -4.05 -3.38 ‡ 84.4 -2.50 -3.72 † 10.2 -4.15 -3.26  74.8 
2 -3.70 -2.87 ‡ 88.9 -3.51 -2.75 ‡ 94.3 -2.50 -3.72 † 10.2 -3.10 -2.73 65.7 
3 -3.26 -2.67 ‡ 86.1 -3.19 -2.71 ‡ 84.4 -2.50 -3.72 † 10.2 -2.65 -2.01 ‡ 94.5 
4 -2.87 -2.33 ‡ 84.3 -2.78 -2.26 ‡ 86.2 -1.87 -3.12 † 5.7 -2.45 -1.97 ‡ 89.1 
5 -2.66 -1.92 ‡ 92.7 -2.59 -1.85 ‡ 91.2 -1.80 -2.52 † 15.1 -2.24 -1.84 ‡ 84.2 
10 -1.91 -1.19 ‡ 94.6 -1.83 -1.64 59.8 -1.45 -2.40 † 7.2 -1.56 -1.34  68.5 
90 1.79 2.24 ‡ 86.2 1.95 1.98 58.7 2.10 0.94 † 1.1 2.24 2.22 53.7 
95 2.34 2.61 76.0 2.56 2.29 32.3 2.80 1.10 † 1.2 2.88 2.67 42.6 
96 2.49 2.68 68.5 2.75 2.46 37.0 2.91 2.54 39.5 3.12 2.76 32.3 
97 2.79 2.73 48.9 3.22 2.53 † 18.3 4.15 3.99 54.3 3.37 2.93 28.8 
98 3.14 3.00 48.2 3.64 3.17 32.0 4.15 3.99 54.3 3.91 3.02 † 14.1 
99 3.77 3.03 † 22.2 4.32 3.99 44.1 4.15 3.99 54.3 5.00 3.34 † 5.9 
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Appendix Table 3: Corporate Bond Mutual Fund t(α) Estimates for Simulated vs. Actual Net Returns by Credit Rating.  Panels A 
and B in this table report t(α) for simulated and actual corporate bond mutual fund net returns at each percentile (Pct) stratified by average 
credit rating using a 5- and 10-factor model. At each percentile, Sim is the average value of t(α) in 10,000 simulations, and %Sim<Act is the 
percent of 10,000 simulations that produce lower t(α) than actual. Superscript † (‡) denote actual t(α) worse (better) than simulated. Differences 
between actual and simulated t(α) may be random when %Sim<Act ≅ 50%. When %Sim<Act ≠50%, actual t(α) is better than simulated if 
Sim<Act and %Sim<Act is greater than 80% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is four times as likely). Actual t(α) is worse than 
simulated t(α) if Sim>Act and %Sim<Act is less than 20% (i.e., a simulated t(α) lower than actual t(α) is one-fourth as likely).  
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Corporate Bond Mutual Funds 
 AAA AA A BBB Low Grade No Rating 
Pct Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Sim 
Actua
l 
%Sim
<Act 
Panel A: 5-Factor Net 
Returns 
               
1 -4.32 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -6.02 -2.57 
‡ 
99.8 -5.92 -2.18 
‡ 
100.0 -4.84 -2.57 
‡ 
99.9 -5.48 -1.84 
‡ 
99.9 -4.24 -1.93 
‡ 
99.9 
2 -4.32 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -4.97 -1.83 
‡ 
100.0 -4.68 -1.89 
‡ 
100.0 -4.31 -2.30 
‡ 
99.9 -4.06 -1.68 
‡ 
99.7 -3.65 -1.87 
‡ 
99.8 
3 -4.32 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -4.64 -1.83 
‡ 
100.0 -4.07 -1.76 
‡ 
100.0 -3.97 -2.28 
‡ 
99.8 -4.03 -1.68 
‡ 
99.7 -3.21 -1.83 
‡ 
99.2 
4 -4.32 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -4.12 -1.77 
‡ 
99.9 -3.67 -1.72 
‡ 
100.0 -3.70 -2.24 
‡ 
99.6 -3.31 -1.55 
‡ 
99.2 -2.91 -1.83 
‡ 
97.8 
5 -4.32 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -3.95 -1.77 
‡ 
99.9 -3.39 -1.57 
‡ 
99.9 -3.49 -2.23 
‡ 
98.9 -3.30 -1.55 
‡ 
99.1 -2.74 -1.73 
‡ 
97.5 
10 -4.31 -0.68 
‡ 
99.0 -2.97 -0.99 
‡ 
100.0 -2.53 -1.08 
‡ 
99.9 -2.66 -1.83 
‡ 
95.0 -2.23 -1.03 
‡ 
98.2 -2.08 -1.26 
‡ 
95.5 
90 3.92 2.15 † 5.4 1.86 2.52 ‡ 87.8 2.32 2.78 ‡ 83.3 2.05 2.70 ‡ 88.6 2.49 2.54 55.5 1.75 2.80 ‡ 96.9 
95 3.93 2.15 † 5.4 2.72 3.32 ‡ 89.9 3.35 3.25 41.7 2.72 3.55 ‡ 92.9 3.27 3.15 51.2 2.47 3.17 ‡ 89.9 
96 3.93 2.15 † 5.4 2.87 3.32 ‡ 84.6 3.70 3.39 35.7 2.92 3.57 ‡ 88.1 3.28 3.15 50.5 2.66 3.18 ‡ 83.3 
97 3.93 2.15 † 5.4 3.29 4.22 ‡ 87.1 4.16 3.47 † 20.4 3.18 4.12 ‡ 92.3 3.79 3.74 59.4 3.01 3.24 69.1 
98 3.93 2.15 † 5.4 3.61 4.22 ‡ 79.2 4.83 3.60 †  9.1 3.57 5.03 ‡ 95.1 3.81 3.74 58.6 3.52 4.06 75.4 
99 3.93 2.15 † 5.4 4.66 7.49 ‡ 88.7 6.09 4.34 † 11.2 4.29 5.17 ‡ 80.6 5.01 4.30 41.2 4.21 4.29 55.4 
Panel B: 10-Factor Net 
Returns 
               
1 -2.45 -1.06 
‡ 
92.0 -5.60 -6.03 35.1 -5.14 -3.06 
‡ 
91.6 -4.04 -2.24 
‡ 
97.8 -4.62 -3.80 54.7 -3.29 -2.26 
‡ 
85.9 
2 -2.45 -1.06 
‡ 
92.0 -4.67 -6.03 
† 
15.1 -3.80 -2.54 
‡ 
90.9 -3.43 -2.12 
‡ 
98.4 -3.18 -3.80 
† 
22.7 -2.79 -2.06 
‡ 
81.6 
3 -2.45 -1.06 
‡ 
92.0 -4.23 -4.48 35.8 -3.21 -2.14 
‡ 
92.4 -3.07 -1.78 
‡ 
99.6 -2.98 -1.32 
‡ 
100.0 -2.40 -1.96 71.4 
4 -2.45 -1.06 
‡ 
92.0 -3.79 -4.48 
† 
20.3 -2.86 -2.10 
‡ 
86.6 -2.82 -1.73 
‡ 
99.0 -2.40 -1.32 
‡ 
99.9 -2.15 -1.54 
‡ 
83.8 
5 -2.45 -1.06 
‡ 
92.0 -3.57 -2.77 
‡ 
84.1 -2.61 -1.94 
‡ 
91.5 -2.63 -1.66 
‡ 
98.0 -2.32 -0.92 
‡ 
100.0 -2.01 -1.49 
‡ 
81.3 
10 -2.44 -1.06 
‡ 
91.9 -2.64 -2.13 
‡ 
79.7 -1.89 -1.39 
‡ 
88.4 -1.98 -1.42 
‡ 
89.7 -1.53 -0.73 
‡ 
98.4 -1.46 -1.10 79.2 
90 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 1.87 1.53 † 10.9 2.22 1.65 † 10.4 2.08 2.27 66.9 2.68 2.51 47.1 1.97 1.84 44.8 
95 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 2.64 2.35 36.4 3.04 1.92 † 1.4 2.81 3.02 64.2 3.55 3.00 33.1 2.63 2.19 27.8 
96 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 2.84 2.97 † 54.4 3.31 2.12 † 0.9 3.02 3.16 58.9 3.64 3.20 38.0 2.82 2.19 † 19.5 
97 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 3.24 2.97 29.7 3.65 2.21 † 0.2 3.28 3.34 52.7 4.28 3.20 † 21.7 3.16 2.49 † 21.1 
98 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 3.66 3.68 65.9 4.21 2.64 † 1.1 3.63 3.49 39.9 4.47 3.53 29.6 3.73 2.56 † 10.2 
99 3.33 1.09 † 2.9 4.55 3.68 41.5 5.53 2.95 † 0.2 4.18 3.82 46.8 5.80 3.53 † 11.2 4.48 2.62 † 3.7 
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Appendix Table 4: Cumulative Economic Value Added Across All Bond Mutual Funds.  At each percentile (Pct) sorted by 𝑡(𝛼). Sim 
𝑡(𝛼) is the average value of annualized alpha in 10,000 simulations using a 5-factor and 10-factor model on net returns. Cumulative assets 
under management (AUM) is the aggregate total amount at each percentile. At each percentile, EVA is computed as the triple product of the 
annualized standard error of 𝛼, differences between actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼), and incremental AUM at each percentile. and aggregated 
across percentiles. Cumulative EVA aggregates EVA from 99th to 1st percentile and expressed as a percentage of cumulative AUM in basis 
points. 
  
  All Bond Funds: 5-Factor Net Returns All Bond Funds: 10-Factor Net Returns 
Pct 
Cumulativ
e Number 
of Funds 
Cumulativ
e AUM 
($Mil) 
Actual 
𝑡(𝛼) 
Sim 
𝑡(𝛼) 
Std Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
Cumulative 
AUM 
($Mil) 
Actual 
𝑡(𝛼) 
Sim 
𝑡(𝛼) 
Std Error 
Actual 
𝛼 
Cumulative 
EVA 
(bps) 
1 6 2,354 -3.27 † -2.58 0.16 30.0 2,878 -2.91 † -2.53 0.70 6.0 
2 12 4,561 -2.44 -2.22 0.21 30.2 3,270 -2.48 † -2.09 0.25 6.2 
3 17 7,408 -2.03 -2.05 0.47 30.4 3,644 -2.18 -1.89 0.36 6.3 
4 23 10,373 -1.81 -1.90 0.62 30.6 4,806 -1.99 -1.73 0.25 6.3 
5 29 10,993 -1.51 -1.79 0.17 30.8 10,505 -1.84 -1.62 0.59 6.3 
10 57 18,150 -0.82 ‡ -1.42 0.27 30.8 45,447 -1.32 -1.22 0.24 6.6 
20 113 42,819 -0.12 ‡ -0.96 1.53 31.1 73,276 -0.62 -0.76 0.23 7.4 
30 170 85,412 0.23 ‡ -0.64 0.50 24.7 132,515 -0.26 -0.43 0.19 7.7 
40 226 122,488 0.61 ‡ -0.36 0.27 22.3 160,275 0.17 -0.14 0.13 8.7 
50 282 202,298 1.06 ‡ -0.10 0.10 21.9 216,621 0.58 ‡ 0.12 0.12 9.2 
60 339 233,646 1.44 ‡ 0.17 0.16 25.6 246,780 0.88 ‡ 0.38 0.18 10.2 
70 395 261,062 1.88 ‡ 0.45 0.24 26.5 302,217 1.16 ‡ 0.66 0.27 10.4 
80 452 313,607 2.33 ‡ 0.77 0.15 25.2 343,772 1.51 ‡ 0.99 0.26 9.1 
90 508 367,486 3.00 ‡ 1.23 0.17 26.3 372,196 1.96 ‡ 1.45 0.09 6.5 
95 536 399,320 3.40 ‡ 1.61 0.12 22.9 402,700 2.27 ‡ 1.84 0.11 7.6 
96 542 403,599 3.55 ‡ 1.73 0.09 24.5 404,903 2.40 ‡ 1.95 0.14 13.4 
97 548 414,929 3.63 ‡ 1.89 0.09 26.7 407,159 2.53 ‡ 2.10 0.10 14.7 
98 553 416,270 3.86 ‡ 2.07 0.28 51.2 416,169 2.88 ‡ 2.30 0.27 17.0 
99 559 419,902 4.45 ‡ 2.49 0.26 51.8 417,100 3.20 ‡ 2.73 0.62 28.8 
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Figure 3: Simulated vs. actual cumulative and probability density functions of 𝒕(𝜶) using a 5-factor and 10-factor model of net 
returns for government bond funds. Solid blue lines are estimated 𝑡(𝛼) from regressions of actual returns over the entire sample period. 
Dotted red lines are estimated average 𝑡(𝛼) from 10,000 bootstrapped simulations. Numbers from left to right below probability density 
functions indicate means and annualized standard deviations for actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼) 
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Figure 4: Simulated vs. actual cumulative and probability density functions of 𝒕(𝜶) using a 5-factor and 10-factor model of net 
returns for corporate bond funds. Solid blue lines are estimated 𝑡(𝛼) from regressions of actual returns over the entire sample period. 
Dotted red lines are estimated average 𝑡(𝛼) from 10,000 bootstrapped simulations. Numbers from left to right below probability density 
functions indicate means and annualized standard deviations for actual and simulated 𝑡(𝛼). 
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Conclusion 
             The first study examines the possible impact that the passage of the GLBA has on the US 
banking sector stability. Passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act, also known as the 
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), allowed bank holding companies (BHCs) to become financial 
holding companies (FHCs) and conduct unrestricted investment banking activities alongside 
commercial banking activities. What was the impact of the Act on systemic risk in Financial 
Institutions? Did it contribute to the instability of the financial system leading up to the Financial 
Crisis? Applying DCC-GARCH model to construct systemic risk measure (SRISK), the study shows 
that 1) systemic risk increased at FHCs relative to other FIs during the financial crisis; 2) FHCs 
increased their investment banking activities significantly post-GLBA. However, the size of FHCs is 
more relevant to the increasing systemic risk than the investment banking activities, and net loan is 
the major contribution to bank size increase; and 3) investment banks’ charter value did not decline. 
             The second study examines whether the US domestic bond mutual funds managers have skills 
that generate abnormal performance for their investors. The parametric t-statistic approach assumes 
that mutual funds’ observed alphas are normally distributed, which is a very strong assumption 
according to prior researches. Following Fama-French (2010) simulation approach, this study tests 
whether the abnormal performance of bond mutual fund managers is skill or just luck. There is 
evidence of selection (and timing), and that bond fund managers possess skill, not just luck. The top 
10% of all bond mutual funds generate significant precision-adjusted alpha 𝑡(𝛼) from timing and 
selection. Results hold for government and corporate bond funds as well as across bond mutual funds 
stratified by assets under management (AUM). Timing is more important than selection, particularly 
in short 3-year horizons. Selection matters most for the largest bond mutual funds with AUM>$750M. 
